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ABSTRACT 
 
BANKING RELATIONSHIP AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
Sungu, Gözde 
M.S., Department of Management 
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Zeynep Önder 
 
July 2013 
 
This thesis examines the relationship between firm performance and the number of 
banking relationships for the publicly traded Turkish firms listed in the Borsa Istanbul 
(BIST) for the period 2003-2011, by using 2SLS model. In the analysis, banks are 
categorized according to their nationalities, ownership structures and orientations; firms 
are classified based on their size as small and large, the sample period is divided into 
two as crisis and non- crisis years, considering the effect of the 2008 global crisis on the 
Turkish economic and financial system. I find that firm performance decreases as the 
number of banking relationships increases, regardless of bank types. However, this 
negative relationship between firm performance and the number of banks is observed 
only in non-crisis times and for only small-sized firms. I also find that firm age, size, 
obtaining funding from external sources other than bank loans, belonging to a group, 
related lending, being a multinational company, incentives obtained from government 
and state-ownership are significant factors affecting the number of banking 
relationships. However, the significances of these variables differ for different bank and 
firm types, and for sub-periods.  
 
 
Keywords: banking relationship, firm performance, crisis, firm size 
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ÖZET 
 
BANKA İLŞKİLERİ VE FİRMA PERFORMANSI 
Sungu, Gözde 
Yüksek Lisans, İşletme Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Zeynep Önder 
 
Temmuz 2013 
 
Bu tez, Türkiye’de 2003-2011 tarih aralığında Borsa İstanbul’da listelenmiş olan 
firmaların performanslarıyla, bu firmaların kredi kullandıkları bankaların sayısı 
arasındaki ilişkiyi 2AEK (iki aşamalı en küçük kareler) modeli kullanarak 
incelemektedir. Araştırmada, bankalar uluslarına, sermaye yapılarına ve yönelimlerine 
göre; firmalar büyüklüklerine göre ve araştırma dönemi 2008 yılında yaşanan küresel 
krizin Tük ekonomisi ve finansal sitemi üzerine etkilerine göre kriz ve kriz harici dönem 
olarak ayrılmıştır. Araştırma sonuçları; firma performanslarıyla kredi kullanılan 
bankaların sayısı arasında negatif bir ilişki olduğunu göstermiştir. Fakat firmalar 
büyüklüğüne göre ve araştırma dönemi kriz ve kriz harici dönem olarak ayrıldığında, bu 
negatif ilişkinin sadece küçük firmalar ve kriz harici dönem için geçerli olduğu 
bulunmuştur. Bununla birlikte, firma yaşı, büyüklüğü, banka kredileri haricinde 
kullanılan diğer borçlanma araçlarının varlığı, grup firması olması, ait olunan grubun 
içindeki firmalardan birinin banka olması, uluslararası bir firma olma, hükümetten 
teşvik alma ve devletin sermayedarlar arasında olması kredi alınan bankaların sayısını 
istatistiksel olarak anlamlı etkilediği gözlenmiştir. Fakat bu faktörlerin anlamlılıkları 
banka türüne, firma büyüklüğüne ve araştırma dönemine göre farklılık göstermektedir. 
 
Anahtar kelimeler: banka ilişkileri, firma performansı, kriz, firma büyüklüğü 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
In the literature, the importance of the financial intermediaries for markets and firms has 
been known for decades (e.g., Leland and Pyle, 1977; Stancill, 1980). Researchers have 
explained this importance by referring to the roles of financial intermediaries in solving 
problems resulted from informational asymmetry in imperfect markets. Among these 
financial institutions, banks are unique in their ability to solve these problems by gaining 
private information about their customers through subsequent and long-term provided 
services (Fama, 1985). Therefore, a remarkable number of analysts have highlighted 
possible effects of the qualifications of the relationship between banks and firms on the 
economy. For example, Mishkin (2008) has recently argued the possible agency 
problem in the lending activities of banks, including securitizations of many credits, as 
the crucial reason for the 2008 global financial crisis. In this thesis, I consider the 
importance of the financial intermediations by examining the relationship between 
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firm performance and the number of banking relationships. 
 
The term “banking relationship” is defined in many ways in the literature. For example, 
Ongena and Smith (2000a) define it as the connection between a bank and its customer 
that goes beyond the execution of simple, anonymous, financial transactions. More 
broadly, Boot (2000) explains it as the provision of financial services by a financial 
intermediary that:  
(i) invests in obtaining customer-specific information, often proprietary in nature, 
(ii) evaluates the profitability of these investments through multiple interactions with 
the same customer over time and/or across products. As these definitions indicate, the 
term banking relationship can be used to express different types of intermediary services 
such as cash or liquidity management and lending related services. In empirical studies, 
researchers commonly use this term to define only the lending (or credit) relationship 
which involves both short-term and long-term loans. Thus, in this study, I focus on the 
lending relationship and use the terms “banking relationship” and “lending relationship” 
interchangeably.  
 
In the literature, most of the empirical evidence for the association between banking 
relationships and firm performance are from developed countries. However, there is no 
clear-cut finding about the impacts of the banking relationships on the performances of 
firms (see Degryse, Kim and Ongena, 2009: 109-115 for the review of this literature). 
Results are different depending on the country being analyzed, the proxy used to 
measure firm performance and the types of banking relationships. For example, Degryse 
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and Ongena (2001) show that firm performance measured with sales decreases with the 
number of banking relationships in Norway, whereas Refait (2003) finds that multiple 
number of banking relationships results in better firm performance in France. In 
addition, in Germany, Gorton and Schmid (2000) report a positive relationship between 
firm performance and the scope of the banking relationship, in contrast to the findings of 
Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) in Japan. 
 
The characteristics of the relationship between firms and banks in emerging countries 
are different from the ones in developed countries. One reason for this difference is that 
emerging countries have different legal frameworks and firm financial structures relative 
to developed countries (La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Schleifer and Vishny 1998; 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimoviç, 1998; Levine, 1999). Since financial markets are not 
well-developed in emerging countries, it is more difficult and costly to raise funds by 
using other external financing sources such as issuing equity or bonds. This makes bank 
loans the main source of external capital and thereby, the relationship between banks 
and firms becomes more important for the firms in emerging markets. Furthermore, 
banks in emerging markets undertake not only the firm risk but also the country risk 
related to the fragility of the banking sector, weak creditor rights or judicial inefficiency 
(Ongena and Smith, 2000b; Qian and Strahan, 2007). Therefore, the relationship 
between banks and firms may be affected by different factors and the impact of this 
relationship on firm performances might differ in emerging markets. 
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However, despite these differences and much research in developed countries, there are 
only two studies that investigate banking relationship in emerging markets. Maurer and 
Haber (2007) investigate related lending in Mexico for the sample period 1888-1913. 
They find that Mexican bankers did not choose to lend to poor performed firms 
measured with productivity level. Limpaphayom and Polwitoon, (2004) examine the 
relation between close bank relationships and both short- and long-term market 
performances in Thailand for the sample period 1990-1996. They measure the 
relationship with the ratio of bank loans to total assets and observe that it does not 
increase firm performances measured with Tobin’s Q. To my knowledge, there is only 
one study that investigates bank-firm relationships in Turkey. Ongena and Şendeniz-
Yüncü (2011), using 16,056 observations, examine Turkish firms’ choices over the bank 
types in 2008. They find that the mean number of banks is 2.1 for 7659 firms that have 
one or more banking relationships. However, they do not investigate the determinants of 
banking relationships and the impact of the banking relationships on firms’ 
performances. In this thesis, I try to empirically analyze the relationship between banks 
and firms’ performances in another emerging market, Turkey, for the period 2003-2011.  
 
After the establishment of Banking Regulations and Supervision Agency (BRSA) in 
2000, the Turkish banking sector has started to be regulated more and has started to 
attract international financial intermediaries from all over the world. With the entrances 
of many foreign banks, there has been a rapid growth in the sector and the degree of 
competitiveness between banks has increased in the 2000s. In addition, the inflation rate 
has been very high in Turkey until quite recently and so, it has been very difficult and 
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costly to raise funds by issuing securities for Turkish firms. For all these reasons, even 
though Turkish financial sector is characterized as a market-based system (Demirgüç-
Kunt and Levine, 1999), bank loans have been relatively easier way of obtaining funds 
compared to other financial alternatives, resulting in higher leverage ratios for Turkish 
firms. Cakova (2011) finds the mean debt ratio as 61% for small- and medium-sized 
Turkish firms, over the period between 1998 and 2008. The mean debt-to-asset ratio was 
41% for the firms listed in the Borsa Istanbul (BIST) for the period 2003-2011. 
However, in Turkey, there is a regulation which restricts the total amount of credit that a 
firm can borrow from a bank. The current banking law No. 5411 (Section 3, Article 54) 
limits the total amount of credit provided to a firm. According to this law, banks are not 
allowed to provide loans more than 25% of their shareholders’ equity. Moreover, a 
manager of one Turkish bank stated that although the amount of credit demanded by 
firms are below the limits, banks do not want to take the total risk by themselves and 
prefer to share the credit risk with other banks, especially after the 2001 Turkish 
banking crisis. The regulations and the behavior of banks might cause Turkish firms to 
have multiple banking relationships and increase the number of banking relationships 
that firms have. As a result, although bank loans have constituted an important source of 
financing for Turkish firms, no “main bank” or “hausbank” relationship is observed 
between banks and firms in Turkey, unlike Japan or Germany. With these 
characteristics, Turkish banking sector has its own idiosyncratic dynamics different 
from other developed countries. However, the association between banking relationships 
and firm performance has not been examined yet and it is important to empirically 
investigate the possible effects of banking relationships on firm performances in Turkey.  
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This thesis analyzes banking relationships for publicly traded firms listed in the BIST 
for the period 2003-2011.Although the Turkish banking system started to be regulated 
with the establishment of BRSA in 2000, in order not to bias the results with the 
negative effects of the 2001 banking crisis in Turkey, the beginning of the sample period 
is determined as 2003.  
 
In the first part of the thesis, I examine the factors affecting the probability of having a 
banking relationship, using the probit model. Then, I investigate possible determinants 
of the number of banking relationships, and the relation between firm performance and 
the number of banking relationships, using the two-stage least square (2SLS) estimation 
model. In this analysis, I control for the other firm characteristics such as firm age, size, 
debt structure and innovativeness, and for year and industry effects. In the literature, 
firm performance is measured with several proxies that indicate some activities of a firm 
over a period of time such as profitability, investment or growth opportunities. In this 
study, firm performance is measured with the profitability of a firm. 
 
I also investigate whether there is any difference in the association between firm 
performance and banking relationships for different types of banking services. It can be 
argued that different types of banking services generate different levels of interaction 
between firms and banks. For example, even though non-cash credits are accepted as 
ordinary bank loans, they are not as risky as cash credits. Therefore, their collateral 
requirements are not as strict as the ones for cash credits, and firms can more easily 
borrow non-cash credits from multiple banks relative to cash credits. Moreover, since 
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non-cash credits seem like trade assurances for firms, these credits do not directly affect 
firm performances, but support them. Thus, the determinants of banking relationships 
and the relationship between firm performance and the number of banks may vary 
according to different types of banking relationships. To investigate this, banking 
relationships are divided into two as cash and non-cash credit relationships and the 
models are estimated separately for these types of bank services. 
 
In the literature, some researchers show that the relationship between firms and banks 
changes during the crisis times. For example, considering the effect of the Asian 
financial crisis around 1997, Fok et al. (2004) explore that Taiwanese firms establish 
new banking relationships with domestic banks and end current relationships with 
foreign banks during the crisis time. Thus, to examine possible impacts of the 2008 
global crisis on the relationship between Turkish firms and banks, I also divide the 
whole sample period into two as crisis and non-crisis periods. Then, I analyze the 
models for these two sub-periods separately. 
 
In the literature, theoretically and empirically it is shown that the number of banking 
relationships is more valid for small-sized firms rather than the large-sized ones for two 
reasons. First, since raising funds by issuing stock or bond is too costly and more 
difficult for small- and medium-sized firms, these firms rely more on bank loans than 
large-sized firms. Second, small-sized firms are generally newly established or young 
firms which do not have enough credit history. Thus, these firms are more likely to 
suffer from asymmetric information problems which can be solved through close 
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banking relationships. Many empirical studies find that the relationship between firms 
and banks differs according to firm size in various countries. For instance, Cesarini 
(1994) find that small-sized firms maintain a small number of banking relationships, 2 
on average; whereas large-sized firms maintain many banking relationships, 33 on 
average, in Italy. Harhoff and Körting (1998a) find that number of creditors increases as 
the size of the small- and medium-sized German firms increases. Therefore, I also 
differentiate my sample into two as large- and small-sized firms and I investigate the 
relationship between firms and banks for these two types of firms separately. 
 
In the analysis, banks are categorized according to their ownership structure, nationality 
and orientation, as in Ongena and Şendeniz-Yüncü (2011). They find that young, large, 
multiple-bank, and industry-diversified firms that are located in or close to Istanbul 
work with foreign banks. They also state that Islamic banks mainly deal with young, 
multiple-bank, industry-focused and transparent firms. Moreover, differentiating banks 
according to their nationality, Fok et al. (2004) find that there is a negative relation 
between the number of domestic-bank relationships and firm performance, but a positive 
one between the number of foreign-bank relationships and firm performance. Thus, I 
also examine whether the relationship between firm performance and the number of 
banks changes according to the bank’s ownership structure, nationality and orientation. 
 
When investigating the probability of having a banking relationship, I find that some 
factors affect both the probability of having one and also the probability of maintaining 
multiple banking relationships. For example, these two probabilities increase with firm 
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size, leverage and obtaining incentives from the government, but decrease with the 
ability of obtaining funding from external sources other than bank loans or from a group 
it belongs to. On the other hand, some factors affect only one of these two probabilities. 
Firm age and being a multinational company affect only the probability of having a 
banking relationship, whereas belonging to a group that owns a bank only affects the 
probability of having multiple banking relationships. 
 
The results from the firm performance estimations show that there is a significantly 
negative relationship between firm performance and the number of banks, independent 
from bank and credit relationship types. More profitable firms maintain a smaller 
number of banking relationships for both cash and non-cash credits regardless of bank 
types. However, this negative relationship between firm performance and the number of 
banks holds for only non-crisis years and small-sized firms and this finding holds for all 
bank types, except Islamic banks. 
 
Results from the banking relationship estimations show that firm profitability and other 
firm characteristics, except firm innovativeness and leverage, are significant factors in 
determining the number of banking relationships. After categorizing banks, I find that 
the factors that significantly affect the number of relationships with foreign and private 
domestic banks are similar and, the relationships with state-owned and Islamic banks are 
also determined by similar factors. For example, as firm profitability increases, the 
number of relationships with foreign and private domestic banks decreases, but the 
number of relationships with state-owned and Islamic banks increases. Controlling the 
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effect of different types of credit relationships, I find that factors affecting the number of 
banking relationships vary across cash and non-cash credit relationships. For example, it 
is observed that there is a negative and significant relationship between obtaining funds 
from external sources other than bank loans and the number of banking relationships for 
only cash credits, but not for the non-cash ones. It is also found that factors that are 
significantly related with the number of banking relationships are different for crisis and 
non-crisis years and these differences change according to bank types. For instance, 
results show that firm performance is a significant factor affecting the number of 
banking relationship for only crisis years and for only private domestic banks. Lastly, 
categorizing firms as small- and large-sized ones, it is found that the factors affecting 
the number of banking relationships, except belonging to a group or a holding, are 
totally different for small- and large-sized firms. 
 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. In chapter 2, I review the theoretical 
and empirical literature on banking relationships and their effects on firm performance. 
Section 3 describes methodology and the data. Section 4 discusses the results of the 
analyses. Lastly Section 5 concludes the study. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
In this section, I first review the theoretical and empirical models that examine whether 
firms have relationships with a single or multiple banks. Then, I summarize the 
literature available on the relationship between firm performance and the number of 
banking relationships. 
 
 
2.1. Literature on Banking Relationships 
2.1.1. Theoretical Models 
 
The need for a financial intermediation has emerged as a natural response of the perfect 
market to the presence of asymmetric information jointly with transaction costs (Leland 
and Pyle, 1977). And among these financial institutions, banks are unique relative to 
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other intermediaries because of their ability to gain private information about their 
customers through the subsequent services provided (Fama, 1985). However, in the 
literature, there are various views about the optimal number of banking relationship to 
benefit from their roles in imperfect markets or from their uniqueness. Within a static 
theoretical setting, Diamond (1984), Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984), and Boyd and 
Prescott (1986) argue that a single banking relationship arises as the optimal delegated 
mechanism in order to reduce monitoring, renegotiation and screening costs that arise 
from informational asymmetries in imperfect markets.  
 
On the other hand, single banking relationships may not be optimal for a firm, since it 
may cause a holdup problem. Sharpe (1990), Fisher (1990) and von Thadden (2004) 
show that a firm may encounter a holdup problem in a single banking relationship since 
single banks can gain ex-post monopoly power by using the proprietary information 
about the firm obtained through close and subsequent relationships. Within a dynamic 
theoretical setting and in a competitive market environment, Sharpe (1990) argues that 
using such a monopoly power, a bank can “informationally” capture a firm, preventing 
it from switching to another bank, if long-term contract possibilities are limited with 
respect to the term of renewals. He proposes multiple banking relationships as a way to 
cope with this holdup problem for firms. Fisher (1990) also studies a simpler version of 
the Sharpe’s (1990) model in his independent work. However, Fisher (1990) indicates 
that multiple banking relationships can be an equilibrium solution only in a mixed 
strategy, not in a pure strategy as Sharpe (1990) indicates. Von Thadden (2004) provides 
a correct analysis for the study of Sharpe (1990). He indicates that the model developed 
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by Sharpe (1990) can only have an equilibrium solution in mixed strategies, which 
features a partial information lock-in by firms and random termination of lending 
relationships. In this way, von Thadden (2004) argue that multiple banking relationships 
can be an equilibrium solution when there is a partial holdup problem and firms are able 
to terminate their lending relationships in such circumstances. 
 
Rajan (1992) argues another type of holdup problem for firms in his comprehensive 
dynamic contracting model. He shows that a bank may call-back loans by using its 
monopolistic power gained through a single banking relationship, when it detects that 
the firm is incapable of performing its financial obligations. He indicates that in such 
cases, the firm suffers from a holdup problem, since it cannot find funds from another 
bank and thereby has to liquidate its project early. He presents multiple banking 
relationships as a solution to this type of holdup problem. However, differently from 
Sharpe (1990) and Fisher (1990), he warns that this solution can cause a winner’s curse 
problem, for an arms’ length bank. He indicates that within a competitive market 
environment where repeated lending is allowed, when an arms’ length bank competes 
with a preexisting bank, it offers lower interest rates for firms aiming to gain them. At 
the same time, knowing the proprietary information of its customers, the pre-existing 
bank differentiates its interest rates offered according to the quality of the firms: lower 
interest rates offered for good firms but higher interest rates offered for bad firms. In the 
end, bad firms choose an arms’ length bank, whereas good firms maintain their 
relationships with the preexisting bank. In such cases, the existing bank experiences a 
14 
 
winner’s curse, since it seemingly succeeds in winning new customers, but actually ends 
up with the bad firms.  
 
Von Thadden (1995) shows that a long-term single credit relationship with a termination 
clause might eliminate both the holdup and winner’s curse problems. He suggests such a 
termination clause that warrants ending the credit relationship when the loan subject to 
the banking relationship is not successful, or continuing the credit relationship with the 
preexisting conditions. He shows that such a clause is beneficial for both firms and 
banks. It allows firms to continue their banking relationships with favorable preexisting 
conditions specified in the initial contract. At the same time, it enables banks to 
unilaterally end the credit relationship early on, if the project financed is not as 
profitable as it is supposed. In this way, von Thadden (1995) presents a dynamic 
perspective on Diamond’s (1984) study. Von Thadden (1995) argues that such a single 
credit relationship with a termination clause can be still optimal for firms in the presence 
of information asymmetry, as Diamond (1984) suggests. 
 
In addition to the holdup problem, single banking relationships may cause another 
problem for firms, called the soft budget constraint problem. It was originally introduced 
by Kornai (1979, 1980 and 1986) as the proliferation of inefficient enterprises resulted 
from the absence of bankruptcy threats in socialist economies. In the banking 
relationship framework, Hart (1995), Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) and Bolton and 
Scharfstein (1996) discuss the soft budget problem as the insufficient firm’s effort in 
preventing a bad consequence resulting from the absence of bankruptcy threats. 
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Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) investigate the incentives of a firm in a decentralized 
and centralized credit market environment, when there is an asymmetric information 
problem. They argue that in a centralized market environment, the absence of 
bankruptcy threat may encourage banks to continue lending further credits, expecting 
that the firm will recover and pay previous debts. They indicate credit decentralization 
as a solution for such cases. Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) show that credit 
decentralization provides financial discipline by offering a way for creditors to not 
finance ex-post inefficient long-term projects and thereby, discouraging ex-ante the 
incentive of managers to accept such projects. 
 
Extending the study of Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) 
consider the case of strategic default occurring because of firm managers. They argue 
that managers who perceive that banks expecting to recover their previous loans will ex-
post continue lending credits might extensively borrow ex-ante. Furthermore, such 
managers aiming to divert cash to them might even cause strategic default for a firm. 
Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) show that borrowing from many banks may prevent such 
situations, since managers must negotiate a restructuring plan with each of many 
claimants at the same time in case of strategic default. On the other hand, they also show 
that borrowing from multiple banks cannot be preferable for firms during the times of 
project refinancing because of the increasing renegotiation costs. In this way, Bolton and 
Scharfstein (1996) present the choice of the optimal number of banking relationships for 
a firm as a tradeoff between the costs or inefficiencies experienced in times of project 
renegotiation and benefits experienced in cases of strategic default. 
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Following Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), Bris and Welch (2005) construct an 
agency/signaling model. They show that when the quality of the firms is settled 
endogenously via the number of the creditors in the model, the higher quality firms 
choose to borrow from fewer banks in order to signal their quality and confidence of not 
going to default. They even state that the extreme case, borrowing from a single bank, 
may be preferred by the firms who need to signal the highest quality. On the other hand, 
Bris and Welch (2005) also indicate that when the quality of the firms is known, then 
firms choose to borrow from many banks since there is no more necessity for signaling 
or financial discipline imposed by the markets. 
 
Petersen and Rajan (1995) develop a multi-period state-contingent loan contract model 
to examine the optimal number of banking relationships. They investigate a firm’s 
ability to borrow from banks that have different market powers. To do this, they 
measure the market power of banks in both concentrated and competitive market 
environments. They show that when the market power of a bank increases, the credit-
constrained young firms get more finance at lower rates and therefore, the value of 
single banking relationships enhances for such firms. On the other hand, they indicate 
that the reverse case is true for older and good quality firms that are, on average, older; 
and good firms are faced with higher interest rates when the monopoly power of the 
bank increases.  
 
Considering the impact of exogenous liquidity shocks in the market, Detragiache, 
Garella and Guiso (2000) argue that relationship banks may be unable to continue 
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funding profitable projects. In such times, if the firm cannot refinance its project with 
the existing bank, then it is required to either refinance by negotiating with an outside 
bank or prematurely liquidate the project. In these circumstances, they suggest that 
outside banks might also refuse to lend since they do not know the quality of the 
projects. Therefore, multiple banking relationships arise as a solution for firms by 
reducing the probability of an early liquidation of the project in times of exogenous 
liquidity shocks in the market. 
 
Von Rheinbaben and Ruckes (2004) theoretically model a firm’s optimal choice of the 
number of lending banks over the extent of information disclosed to these banks. They 
present this choice as a tradeoff between the benefits of low credit rates offered by many 
banks and the costs of valuable private information leakage to competitors in the market. 
Hence, firms determine not only the number of banking relationships but also the scope 
of their relationship with banks based on the decision to reveal confidential information 
to the market. Von Rheinbaben and Ruckes (2004) predict a U-shaped relationship 
between the degree of innovativeness and the number of banking relationships. On one 
hand, they find that as long as a firm decides to reveal private information, a higher 
degree of innovativeness makes fewer banking relationships optimal and there is a 
negative relation between the degree of innovativeness and the number of banks. On the 
other hand, after some degree of innovativeness, firms become highly sensitive to the 
information leakage and therefore, choose not to reveal its confidential information in 
order not to impair output market success. In such cases, firms maintain multiple 
banking relationships and create competition among these banks in order to decrease 
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borrowing rates. Consequently, the initial negative relation between the degree of 
innovativeness and the number of banking relationships reverses as the degree of 
innovativeness continues to increase. 
 
Most of the papers examining the optimum number of banking relationships assume that 
firms borrow equal proportions from each bank. However, there could be asymmetric or 
concentrated borrowing activity; that is, while a firm borrows smaller amounts from 
multiple arms’ length banks for daily capital needs, it may mainly finance its big 
investment projects by extensively borrowing from a single relationship bank. Because 
of this, asymmetric borrowing activity is an important issue and thus, deserves to be 
examined. In the literature, Hubert and Schafer (2002) argue that under the presence of 
coordination failure between lending banks, many banks wrongly evaluate a firm as 
financially distressed and as a result, successively withdraw loans to preempt assets of 
the firms in case of a default. They show that at such times, a firm may be forced into 
bankruptcy with successive withdrawals, even though it is not the actual case. Hubert 
and Schafer (2002) indicate that firms may prevent such situations with multiple but 
asymmetric borrowing activities, which increase the bargaining power of the main bank 
and thus, provide coordination among lending banks. 
 
Following Hubert and Schafer (2002), Elsas, Heinemann and Tyrell (2004) also analyze 
the optimal debt structure of a firm by allowing multiple but asymmetric bank 
borrowing. In their study, Elsas, Heinemann and Tyrell (2004) present supporting results 
for the findings of Hubert and Schafer (2002). They indicate that large scaled 
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borrowings from a main bank and small scaled borrowings from other arm’s length 
banks at the same time can be optimal, when many arm’s length banks decide to call 
back their loans at the interim stage of an investment project because of the coordination 
failure. In addition to this, they also suggest that such a multiple but asymmetric 
borrowing structure may be optimal especially for risky firms or for firms with low 
expected cash flows. 
 
In contrast to the study of Hubert and Schafer (2002), Guiso and Minetti (2006) argue 
that lending banks may also prefer to continue financing investments if these banks aim 
to seize assets of a firm by preempting in case of any default. However, Guiso and 
Minetti (2006) indicate that with multiple but asymmetric borrowing activities, firms 
may prevent such an opportunistic activity by creating differences in the seizing abilities 
of lending banks. In their study they show that arm’s length banks may object to 
continue of financing bad investments, since these banks have limited seizing ability 
with their small scaled lending amounts compared to the seizing ability of a relationship 
bank. 
 
In summary, the theoretical literature presents mixed evidences for the optimal number 
of banking relationships. One group suggests single banking relationships as an optimal 
mechanism to reduce costs arising from information asymmetries between firms and 
banks. The other group argues that having multiple banking relationships is optimal to 
deal with the holdup and soft budget constraint problems. Another group of studies 
indicates that the choice of the optimal number of banking relationships is a tradeoff 
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between the costs of strategic defaults and the benefits experienced in times of liquidity 
shock. Also, some other research constructs this tradeoff based on the costs and benefits 
resulting from the decision to reveal the firm’s confidential information to the market. 
These studies predict a U-shaped relationship between the importance of revealing 
confidential information and the number of banking relationships. Under the assumption 
of asymmetric and concentrated borrowing activity, another group shows that large 
scaled borrowings from a main bank and small scaled borrowings from other arm’s 
length banks can be optimal for firms in the presence of some conditions. Therefore, 
many empiric studies test the validity of these theoretical findings for different countries 
or firms within a country. 
 
 
2.1.2. Empirical Evidences 
 
For a variety of countries, there are many empirical studies which estimate the number 
of banking relationships. Both mean and median number of banks presents a great 
difference across countries. For example, the mean number of banks is one for Belgium 
firms (Degryse, Masschelein and Mitchell, 2004) and 30 for Italian firms (D’Auria, 
Foglia and Reedtz, 1999). The striking thing is that there is a large variation among 
firms within the same country in the terms of the number of banking relationships. For 
example, the firm size has an effect on the number of banking relationships. In Italy, 
while small-sized firms maintain on average two banking relationships, large-sized 
firms maintain on average 33 numbers of banking relationships (Cesarini, 1994). 
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Because of differences across and within countries, many studies have empirically 
investigated the macro and micro level determinants of the number of banking 
relationships.  
 
On the micro level, almost all research indicates that both firm age and size are 
significant determinants of the number of banking relationships. For instance, the 
number of creditors increases with the size and age of small U.S. firms for the sample 
period 1988-1989 (Petersen and Rajan, 1994) and of small- and medium-sized German 
firms for the sample year 1997 (Harhoff and Körting, 1998a). In addition, many studies 
present a variety of other firm characteristics as significant determinants such as 
profitability, leverage and bank debt level (see Degryse et al., 2009: 82-85, 87-91 for the 
reviews). However, some of these characteristics can have different effects on the choice 
of the optimum number of banking relationships in different countries. For example, 
Tirri (2007) finds that there is no relationship between firm profitability, measured by 
gross operating margin divided by sales, and the number of banking relationships, in 
Italy. However, Ziane (2003), and Harhoff and Körting (1998a) observe a negative 
relation between firm profitability and number of banks in France and Germany 
respectively, unlike Tirri (2007). They measure firm profitability by using different 
proxies. Ziane (2003) measures firm profitability with the ratio of operating profitability 
to turnover, whereas Harhoff and Körting (1998a) measure it with the ratio of net 
income to interest payments. 
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Controlling for borrowing firm characteristics, some studies investigate the effects of 
bank and market characteristics on the number of banking relationships such as 
ownership structure of banks or market concentration (Detragiache et al., 2000; Yu and 
Hsieh,2003; Tirri, 2007; Neuberger, Pedergnana and Räthke-Döppner, 2008; Berger, 
Klapner, Martinez and Zaida, 2008). For example, Detragiache et al. (2000) find a 
negative relationship between the number of banks and bank fragility for small-sized 
Italian firms, as they suggest theoretically. Their study measures bank fragility with two 
different proxies: observed changes in the ratio of liquid funds to assets and weighted 
average of the ratio of nonperforming loans to assets. In addition to this, Neuberger et al. 
(2008) find that the number of bank relationships increase in bank size for the sample 
year of 1996 and Swiss firms with an average of 4 employees. Berger et al. (2006) and 
Yu and Hsieh (2003) indicate that the probability of having multiple banking 
relationships increases when the bank is owned by a governmental entity or by a foreign 
institution in India and Taiwan. Tirri (2007) and Berger et al. (2006) find that the 
probability of having a multiple number of banking relationships decreases as market 
concentration increases in Italy and India, respectively. 
 
For Turkey, the empirical study of Ongena and Şendeniz-Yüncü (2011) provide 
information about the number of banking relationships. They investigate their analysis 
by using a representative dataset from Turkey and thereby indicate specific findings for 
Turkey. However, in their study, they examine firms’ choices over the bank types 
according to r set of firm and bank characteristics, not the number of banking 
relationships. Therefore, their study indicates only some descriptive statistics and 
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insights into how firm characteristics vary for different bank types. Using 16,056 
observations for the sample year 2008, Ongena and Şendeniz-Yüncü (2011) find the 
mean number of banks as 2.1 for those that have one or more number of banking 
relationships. 
 
In macro level, Ongena and Smith (2000b) present the first study that explains the 
variation across countries. They show that, controlling for a variety of firm- and 
country-specific variables such as dependence on public capital markets or market 
concentration or legal structures, on average firms maintain more bank relationships in 
countries with inefficient judicial systems, poor enforcement of creditor rights, 
unconcentrated but stable banking systems and active public bond markets. Supporting 
the findings of Ongena and Smith (2000b), Qian and Strahan (2007) also show that the 
number of lending relationships is low in countries with better protection of creditor 
rights and in contrast, it is higher in more risky countries, as measured by the sovereign 
debt rating. 
 
Apart from these empirical studies, Ongena, Tümer-Alkan and von Westernhagen 
(2007) investigate the determinants of multiple but asymmetric borrowing activities for 
German firms using both bank and firm level data. Controlling for both firm and bank’s 
profitability and ownership structure with firm’s asset specificity variables, they find 
that risky, illiquid, large and leveraged firms spread their borrowings more equally 
between multiple arms’ length banks. Furthermore, they show that a relationship bank 
might capture funds provided by other arm’s length banks if the relationship bank is a 
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public sector bank and if the other banks are large enough to not tie up additional funds 
in capital. 
 
A new interesting research question which recently draws attention is whether or how 
the number of banking relationships changes over the business cycle of a firm. 
However, only a few studies have access to the necessary data for investigation and 
present evidence about the variation of number of banking relationships over the 
business cycle. For example, D’Auria et al (1999) analyze the stability of lending 
relationships over time between the periods of 1985 and 1993 in Italy. They find that 
firms attempt to broaden the range of financial sources rather than substitute the existing 
one with another, over time. Sterken and Tokutsu (2002) investigate the determinants of 
the number of banking relationships of listed Japanese firms between 1982 and 1999. 
Considering the effect of the asset price bubble in the 1980s, they show that there was a 
general increase in the number of loans over this period, whereas the average number of 
banking relationships started to decrease in 1982 and reached the lowest level in 1989 
when the bubble bursts. Therefore, Sterken and Tokutsu (2002) argue that there was a 
credit concentration in the number of banking relationships during the bubble period. 
However, they also show that this credit concentration dispersed with the burst of the 
bubble, in 1990s. 
 
To sum up, the empirical studies indicate that the optimum number of banking 
relationships varies both across and within countries. Furthermore, studies suggest that 
both country characteristics such as the judicial system, the risk level of a country or 
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type of banking system in a country, as well as firm and bank characteristics affect the 
number of banks with which a firm has a relationship.  
 
2.2. Literature on the Relationship between Firm Performance and Banking 
Relationships 
2.2.1. Theoretical Models 
 
The number of banking relationships can affect firm performance in different ways. In a 
static theoretical setting, Diamond (1984), Ramakrishna and Thakor (1984) and Boyd 
and Prescott (1986) argue that single banking relationships enhance firm performance 
by reducing monitoring, renegotiation and screening costs arising because of 
informational asymmetries. Even though these studies acknowledge that multiple 
banking relationships may likewise reduce these costs, they also point out that multiple 
banking relationships may increase borrowing costs as well and thus mitigate firm 
performance. 
 
In a different theoretical setting, Yosha (1995) and Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995) also 
argue the positive effect of a single banking relationship on firm performance. In their 
studies, they analyze the effect of private information leakage resulting in a multiple 
banking relationship on firm performance. Yosha (1995) shows that firms that are 
expected to lose more in case of an information leakage prefer single banking 
relationships and thereby increase firm performance. Similar to Yosha (1995), 
Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995) also show that if interim disclosure of R&D knowledge 
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is too severe, then R&D intensive firms perform better by maintaining a single banking 
relationship rather than maintaining multiple banking relationships. 
 
Different form Yosha (1995) and Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995), von Rheinbaben and 
Ruckes (2004) show that the relationship between the number of banks and firm 
performance depends on the decision of information disclosure made by a firm itself. In 
their study, they assume that the decision of revealing private information is 
independent from the choice of the optimal number of banking relationships, since a 
firm itself, not a bank, decides to disclose private information. Based on this 
assumption, von Rheinbaben and Ruckes (2004) indicate that the profitability of a firm 
decreases with the number of banking relationships if it decides to reveal its private 
information. On the other hand, they also show that if a firm decides not to disclose its 
private information and if there is enough competition among banks, then multiple 
banking relationships may reduce borrowing rates and thereby enhances firm 
performance.  
 
Rajan (1992) and von Thadden (1995) discuss that multiple banking relationships may 
enhance firm performance by eliminating information lock-in problems and decreasing 
holdup costs that occur when banks exploit their monopoly powers obtained through 
single banking relationships. Beside these studies, Detragiache et al. (2000) analyze the 
effect of exogenous liquidity shocks on the relationship between the number of banks 
and firm performance. They argue that in time of exogenous liquidity shocks, a 
relationship bank may object to refinance good projects and thus the firm has to 
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prematurely liquidate its project. They show that in such cases, multiple banking 
relationships may increase firm performance by reducing risk of premature liquidation 
of profitable projects. 
 
Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) discuss two-sided effects of multiple banking 
relationships on firm performance. On one hand, they indicate that multiple banking 
relationships may decrease firm performance by increasing negotiation costs occurred at 
the time of strategic defaults. On the other hand, as Detragiache et al. (2000) suggest, 
Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) also indicate that multiple banking relationships may 
increase firm performance by diversifying risks arising in case of exogenous liquidity 
shocks to the banking system.  
 
In summation, theoretical models show different relationships between firm 
performance and the number of banks. One group of studies considers the effect of costs 
associated with informational asymmetries and private information leakage. These 
studies argue that having a single banking relationship reduces these costs and thereby 
enhances firm performance. The other group of studies considers the effect of costs 
resulting from information lock-in and holdup problems. And in contrast to the first 
group, this group argues that having multiple banking relationships increases firm 
performance by decreasing costs arising from information lock-in and holdup problems. 
Different from these two groups, the study of Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) considers 
the effect of strategic defaults and presents the effect of banking relationships on firm 
performance as two-sided. 
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2.2.2. Empirical Evidences 
 
Several empirical studies examine the impact of the number of banking relationships on 
firm performance in various countries. These studies measure firm performance with 
different proxies such as profitability, investment and growth opportunities. Table 1 
summarizes the results of the studies that measure firm performance with profitability 
measures. Like theoretical results, empirical results presented in the fourth column of 
Table 1 also indicate that there is no consistent relationship between the number of 
banks and firm performance. For example, Degryse and Ongena (2001) find that 
Norwegian firms with a single banking relationship actually perform better than others 
with multiple banking relationships. They measures firm performance with three 
different profitability proxies; ratio of operating income to sales, return of assets (ROA) 
and return on equity (ROE) and for all, this finding is valid. Similarly, Castelli et al. 
(2012) and Montoriol-Garriga (2006) also find a negative relationship between firm 
performance and the number of banks in Italy and Spain, respectively. Measuring firm 
performance with ROA and ROE, Castelli et al. (2012) indicate that firm performance 
increases as the number of banks decreases. They also show that this finding is stronger 
for small firms than for large firms. Montoriol-Garriga (2006) uses ROA and sales 
growth to measure firm performance for the main study. She also uses five more 
measures; economic profitability, financial profitability, return on shareholders’ funds, 
asset turnover and value added growth, to measure firm performance for the robustness 
check analysis. Using a panel data set for small- and medium-sized firms in the period 
1993-2004, Montoriol-Garriga (2006) find that firms maintaining multiple banking 
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relationships have lower profitability. These results provide evidences supporting the 
theoretical view that fewer bank relationships reduce information asymmetries and 
agency problems, which outweigh the negative effects arising from holdup problems, 
and thus increase firm performance better than multiple banking relationships.  
 
Table 1: Impact of the Banking Relationships on Firm Performance 
 
Study 
Country 
Sample 
Period, 
Firm Size 
Number of 
Observation 
Measure of 
Firm Performance 
Relation with 
Firm 
Performance 
Castelli, Dwyer, Jr. 
and Hasan (2012) 
Italy 
1998-2000, 
(30) 
number 
of 
employees 
10.764 
ROA, ROE, 
Interest over Assets, 
Sales over Assets 
↔↔ 
Horiuchi (1994) 
Japan 
- - ROA 0 
Hiraki, Ito and Kuroki 
(2003) 
Japan 
1991-98, 
Listed 
Firms 
10.344 ROA +++ 
Degryse and Ongena 
(2001) 
Norway 
1985-96, 
Listed 
Firms 
1.897 
Various Profitability 
Measures 
(Simultaneous 
Equations) 
↔↔↔ 
Montoriol-Garriga 
(2006) 
Spain 
1993-2003, 
Small 
Firms 
41.593 
7 Profitability Measures 
(Simultaneous 
Equations) 
↔↔↔ 
Fok et al. (2004) 
Taiwan 
1994-98, 
Large 
Firms 
 
ROA 
(Simultaneous 
Equations) 
Domestic: 
↔↔↔ 
Foreign: +++ 
Yu et al. (2007) 
Taiwan 
1991-2000, 
Large 
Firms 
579 
ROA 
(Simultaneous 
Equations) 
↔↔↔ 
Source: Degryse et al., 2009, pg. 111-114, Table 4.13 
Studies are listed according to country and then, year of the study.  
0 No relationship 
+++ Positive and significant at 1% level 
↔↔↔ Negative and significant at 1% level 
↔↔Negative and significant at 5% level 
 
Yu et al. (2007) examine how issuing public debt affects the relationship between firm 
performance and the number of banks, using a three stage least square (3SLS) 
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simultaneous estimation model. They find that public debt issuance plays a significantly 
negative role in determining the effect of the number of banks on firm performance, 
whereas it plays a significantly positive role in determining the effect of firm 
performance on the number of banking relationships. That is, firms accessing public 
debt end up with lower profitability levels, and with larger number of baking 
relationship. 
 
On the other hand, by distinguishing domestic and foreign banking relationships, Fok et 
al. (2004) find that firm performances negatively related with the number of domestic 
banking relationships but positively related with the number of foreign banking 
relationships in Taiwan. They also explore firms’ behavior during the Asian crisis in the 
1990s. They find that firms establish new banking relationships with domestic banks 
and end their relationships with foreign banks during the crisis time. 
 
Horiuchi (1994) examine the relationship between number of “main bank” relationship 
and firm profitability in Japan. The major characteristic of the Japanese “main bank” 
relationship is that a firm’s “main bank” is usually a principal shareholder of the firm 
and its primary lender. Thus, the firm’s “main bank” usually plays an important role in 
monitoring the firm and assisting it during periods of crisis (Aoki, Patrick and Sheard, 
1994). In this framework, Horiuchi (1994) finds that there is no statistically significant 
difference between ROA values of Japanese firms having one, two or three “main 
banks.” Like Horiuchi (1994), Hiraki et al. (2003) investigate the impact of “main bank” 
relationships on firm profitability but find that when borrowing from a single main bank, 
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borrowing is negatively related to the profitability of the Japanese companies listed on 
the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Moreover, they also report that having multiple “main 
bank” relationships is associated with an increase in firm profitability by reducing the 
holdup costs of firms, especially for those with higher value of growth opportunities. 
 
Beside these, some studies measure firm performance with other ratios instead of 
profitability measures in order to examine the impact of the number of banking 
relationships on firm performance. For example, considering all banking relationships 
besides “main bank,” Kang and Stulz (2000) measure firm performance with stock 
performance measures and examine the effect of the Japanese banking crisis on firms 
listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange from 1986 to 1993. The Japanese banking crisis 
occurred when the asset price bubble burst in 1989. Thus, Kang and Stulz (2000) divide 
the sample period into two as before and after banking crisis periods. They find that 
firms with close banking relationships had better stock performance before the banking 
crisis, whereas these firms had worse stock performance during the crisis period. 
 
Some studies examine the relationship between number of banks and the probability of 
survival of new firms in the market. Foglia, Laviola, and Reedtz (1998) show that small 
and financially distressed Italian firms prefer to have more creditors. Using a dataset for 
Portuguese firms, Farinha and Santos (2006) find that startup firms maintaining a single 
banking relationship are more likely to survive for longer periods than those firms with 
multiple banking relationships. They also show that startup firms which have a bank, 
except state-owned banks, among its shareholders have a higher probability of survival 
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in future. However, this relationship does not hold if one of the shareholders is a state-
owned bank. 
 
For publicly traded U.S. firms over the period 1980-1993, Houston and James (2001) 
examine whether financial constraints vary with the reliance on bank debt and with the 
number of banks that a firm has a relationship. Defining cash flow sensitivity as a 
financial constraint, they show that single-bank firms are significantly more cash-flow-
constrained than multiple-bank firms. However, Houston and James (2001) also point 
out that cash flow sensitivity of a single-bank firm arises from greater cash flow 
sensitivity for a large investment project. Thus, for a modest level of investment 
projects, there is no difference between single-bank and multiple-bank firms in terms of 
being financially constrained. 
 
There are other studies that investigate the impact of the banking relationships on the 
availability and costs of borrowings to the firms (Weistein and Yafeh, 1998; Harhoff 
and Körting, 1998b; Petersen and Rajan, 1994).These studies examine the indirect effect 
of the number of banking relationships on firm performance. Analyzing only main bank 
relationships in Japan between 1977 and 1986, Weistein and Yafeh (1998) show that 
main banks offer higher interest rates to their clients and firms with multiple main banks 
are offered lower borrowing rates. This result provides supporting evidence to the 
theoretical results of Rajan (1992) and von Thadden (1995). However, for small U.S. 
firms, Petersen and Rajan (1994) find that multiple bank relationships increase lending 
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rates and reduce the availability of credit. Thus, unlike Weistein and Yafeh (1998), they 
show that multiple banking relationships indirectly decrease firm performance. 
 
Harhoff and Körting (1998b) study the impact of “hausbank” relationship in Germany. 
In the German “hausbank” relationship, companies give priority to one bank which runs 
the core of their banking business, and in return, banks also give priority to their 
“hausbank” customers. In such a relationship, “hausbank” supports their customers’ 
day-to-day business activities through electronic and international banking services, 
receivable management and treasury activities. The “hausbank” relationship is generally 
seen as long-term and stable partnership. In this vein, Harhoff and Körting (1998b) 
indicate that the “hausbank” relationships and concentrated borrowings are desirable for 
German firms since such firms are significantly better than other firms in terms of 
collateral requirements, interest rates and credit availability. 
 
Despite these studies in the developed countries, there are only two studies that 
investigate the impact of the banking relationships on firm performance in emerging 
markets. Maurer and Haber (2007) investigate related lending relationships in Mexico 
for the sample period 1888-1913. They find that Mexican bankers did not choose to lend 
to poor performed firms measured with productivity level. Limpaphayom and Polwitoon 
(2004) investigates the impact of the lending relationships measured with the ratio of 
both short- and long-term bank loans to total assets on firm performances in Thailand 
for the sample period 1990-1996. They find a negative relationship between bank 
lending and both short- and long-term performances of firms measured with Tobin’s Q. 
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To my knowledge, there is no study that investigates the impact of the banking 
relationships on firm performances in Turkey. 
 
Consequently, the empirical studies indicate that the relationship between firm 
performance and the number of banks differ both across and even within countries. 
Furthermore, studies suggest that bank type and the degree of the relationship between 
banks and firms affect the results. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
EMPIRICAL MODELS AND DATA 
 
 
 
In this thesis, first, the probability of having a banking relationship is examined. For all 
firms in the sample, initially the factors affecting the probability of having any banking 
relationship is analyzed. Then, for firms that have a banking relationship, the probability 
of having a single and multiple banking relationships is investigated. Probit model is 
used in these two analyses.  
 
Second, the relationship between the number of banks and firm performance is 
analyzed.  Initially, I investigate the determinants of the number of banking 
relationships, and then examine whether the number of banking relationships affects 
firm performance or not. The 2SLS model is used in the analysis as in the studies of 
Degryse and Ongena (2001), Fok et al. (2004), Montoriol-Garriga (2006), and Yu et al. 
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(2007). Hence, the firm performance equation is estimated jointly with the banking 
relationship equation. I also differentiate banks into various types in order to analyze 
whether the results change or not. Following Ongena and Şendeniz-Yüncü (2011), 
banks are categorized according to their nationality, ownership structure and orientation, 
as domestic, private, foreign, state-owned and participation (Islamic) banks. 
 
Third, I investigate whether the types of credit relationships between a firm and a bank 
affect the determinants of the number of banks or the impact of the number of banks on 
firm performance. In this thesis, since I just focus on the credit relationship between a 
firm and a bank, I can only differentiate banking relationships as cash and non-cash 
credit ones. 
 
Fourth, I examine whether the 2008 global crisis creates any difference in the 
relationship between firm performance and the number of banks. The whole sample 
period is divided into two sub-periods as crisis and non-crisis years. The crisis years are 
those that the global crisis affected the Turkish economic and financial system. In the 
literature, some studies state that the effects of the 2008 global crisis was firstly seen in 
the second quarter of the year 2008 and continued till the end of 2009 in Turkey (for 
example, Claessens, Dell’Ariccia, Igan and Leaven, 2010; Alp and Elekdağ, 2011). In 
addition, the growth rate of the gross domestic product in Turkey started to reduce in 
2008 and was negative until the fourth quarter of 2009 (Table A). Therefore, the 2008 
global crisis is assumed to affect the Turkish economic and financial system in 2008 and 
2009. These years are taken as crisis years. 
37 
 
Lastly, I analyze whether the relationship between firm performance and the number of 
banks changes for different firm sizes. The sample is divided into two as large- and 
small-sized firms based on the median value of the market value of firms in each year. 
The models are estimated separately for these two firm types. 
 
 
3.1. Empirical Models 
3.1.1. Model for the Probability of Having a Banking Relationship 
 
First, the factors affecting the probability of having any banking relationship are 
examined. Second, for the firms that have any banking relationship, the factors affecting 
the probability of having a single or multiple banking relationships is analyzed. Two 
dummy variables are created for these estimations: RELATION and MULTIPLE. The 
dummy variable RELATION equals to one if a firm has any banking relationship and 
zero otherwise. The dummy variable MULTIPLE takes the value of one for firms with 
multiple banking relationships and zero for firms with a single banking relationship. The 
following models are estimated using the probit models: 
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In these models, the dependent variable, banking relationship, is measured with the 
dummy variables, RELATION and MULTIPLE. The independent variables consist of 
several firm characteristics: performance of a firm, ROA, its age, AGE; its size, SIZE; 
innovativeness, INNOVA; leverage, LEVERAGE; obtaining funds external sources 
other than bank loans, NONFIN; belonging to a group or a holding, GROUP; having a 
related bank, BMEMBER; state-ownership of a firm, STATE; being a multinational 
company, MNC; and any incentives provided by government agencies to a firm, 
INCENT. The year and industry fixed effects,  and , are controlled in the model. 
These variables are determined based on the models used in the literature. 
 
Firm performance is used to express the overall results of any financial activity in a 
firm, namely firm profitability. ROA, net income divided by total assets, is used a 
measure of firm profitability. It is widely used in the literature as a proxy for firm 
performance. In the literature, there is no clear cut finding about the association between 
firm profitability and the probability of having any banking relationship. For example 
Detragiache et al. (2000) and Dietsch and Golitin-Boubakari (2002) find that firm 
performance decreases the probability of having any banking relationship in Italy and 
France. On the other hand, Tirri (2007) find a positive relationship between firm 
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profitability and the probability of having any and multiple banking relationships in 
France. 
 
The age of a firm, AGE, is included in the models to capture the length of the firm 
achievement. It is measured as the logarithm of firm’s age since its establishment. In 
general, since establishing a banking relationship takes time, the probability of having a 
banking relationship is expected to increase as firms get older. However, since older 
firms are better known in the market, they may face less adverse selection problems and 
thus have probably less need to maintain multiple banking relationships. Therefore the 
sign of the coefficient on AGE is expected to be positive in the first model but to be 
negative in the second one. 
 
The size of a firm, SIZE, is measured by the natural logarithm of the market value of a 
firm, as it is widely used in the literature. I expect a positive relationship between firm 
size and both probabilities because of two reasons. First, larger firms may prefer to 
maintain multiple banking relationships in order to eliminate any risk coming from the 
liquidity shock to their banks. Second, larger firms conduct more businesses from 
different branches or a business in different regions. Thus, they may choose to maintain 
multiple banking relationships in order to finance such a complex business.  
 
The innovativeness of a firm is calculated as R&D expenditures divided by sales, 
following Skinner (1993). In the literature, von Rheinbaben and Ruckes (2004) show a 
U-shaped relationship between the degree of firm innovativeness and the number of 
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banking relationships. They show that as long as a firm decides to reveal private 
information, a higher degree of firm innovativeness makes fewer banking relationships 
optimal. On the other hand, when profits are highly sensitive to information leakage, the 
firm chooses not to reveal its confidential information in order not to impair output 
market success. In such cases, firms prefer to maintain multiple banking relationships to 
decrease borrowing rates by benefiting from competition among banks. Although I 
expect a positive relationship between firm innovativeness and having a banking 
relationship, the relationship between innovativeness and the probability of having 
multiple banking relationships can be both positive and negative, controlling for the 
industry that a firm operates. 
 
The variable LEVERAGE is included in the models to control the debt level of a firm. It 
is measured by a debt ratio, total debt to total asset. In the literature, some studies 
suggest that, ceteris paribus, banks may decline to lend to highly levered firms because 
of the high probability of default. Thus, as firms become highly leveraged, the 
probability of having multiple banking relationships might decrease. On the other hand, 
some empirical studies indicate that there is a positive relationship between leverage of 
a firm and the probability of having multiple banking relationships. For example, 
Roberts and Siddiqi (2004) and Tirri (2007) find that highly leveraged firms are more 
likely to have multiple banking relationships in the U.S. and Italy, respectively. 
Therefore, while the sign of the coefficient of this variable is expected to be positive in 
the first model, it can be both positive and negative in the second model. 
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The variable NONFIN is used to control the level of the firm’s liabilities other than bank 
loans. It is calculated as a percentage of non-bank liabilities in total liabilities of a firm. 
If a firm finds financing from other sources such as trade credits, rather than borrowing 
from banks, then the probabilities of having any and multiple banking relationships are 
expected to be lower and vice versa. Therefore, I expect a negative relationship between 
NONFIN and the probabilities of having any and multiple banking relationships. 
 
I include the dummy variable of group membership, GROUP, to capture the effect of 
belonging to a group or a holding. It takes a value of one if a firm belongs to any group 
or a holding, and zero otherwise. If a firm is a member of a group of companies, it may 
easily find funds from the other firms in the group, and thus may rely less on borrowing 
from banks. Therefore, I expect a negative relationship between GROUP and the 
probabilities of having any and multiple banking relationships. 
 
If a firm or its group owns a bank, this firm may get funding easily or get any other 
financial services from their banks at more favorable terms or conditions. Therefore, 
such firms may choose to maintain a banking relationship with only their bank. To 
capture this effect, I add a dummy variable BMEMBER in the models. This dummy 
variable equals to one if a firm is a part of a group that owns a bank, and equals to zero 
otherwise. This variable is expected to be negatively related to the probability of having 
multiple banking relationships. 
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STATE is another dummy variable which equals to one if any government entity owns 
at least 5 percent of shares of a firm and equals to zero otherwise. If any government 
entity is a shareholder of a firm, it will be easier to establish a banking relationship with 
a state-owned bank. Thus, the variable STATE is expected to be negatively related to 
the probability of having multiple banking relationships. 
 
I define a firm as a multinational company if a foreign owner holds more than 5percent 
of the company’s shares or equity and create the dummy variable MNC which equals to 
one if a firm is a multinational company and zero otherwise. Multinational firms may 
prefer to maintain more and different types of banking relationships to finance its 
businesses in different countries, like large firms. Therefore I expect MNC to be 
positively related to the probabilities of having any and multiple banking relationships. 
 
Firms that obtain incentives from the government may rely less on bank loans. In this 
context, to capture the impact of incentives on banking relationship, I add a dummy 
variable, INCENT, in the models. It equals to one if a firm obtains any type of incentive 
from any government entity such as credits, grants, investment allowances, value-added-
tax exemption certificate or remission of duty, and zero otherwise. I expect INCENT to 
be negatively related to the probabilities of having any and multiple banking 
relationships. 
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The industry dummy variables, , are included into the equations to control for the 
possible effects of the sectors within which a firm operates. Industries are classified 
according to the grouping used by the Public Disclosure Platform (PDP). Firms in the 
sample are from eight main industries: education, health, sport and other social services; 
electricity, gas and water; manufacturing; construction and prosperity; mining; 
technology; wholesalers, retailers, hotels and restaurants; and transportation, 
communication and storage. In addition to these industry dummy variables, I control for 
time effects by including year dummy variables, . There are nine calendar year 
dummy variables for the sample period 2003-2011. 
 
Table 2 summarizes the expected signs of the coefficients of the explanatory variables in 
the models explaining the probabilities of any and multiple banking relationships. 
 
 
3.1.2. Model for Banking Relationships 
 
As Degryse and Ongena (2001), Fok et al. (2004), Montoriol-Garriga (2006) and Yu et 
al. (2007) suggest, there can be simultaneity (endogeneity) problem in estimating 
banking relationship and firm performance models by using the ordinary least square 
(OLS) model. In order to determine which model, the OLS or 2SLS,should be used in 
the estimations, the Hausman test is employed. The test results presented in the 
Appendix Table B favor the 2SLS estimation model (the coefficient of the banking 
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relationship equation’s residuals is significant at 1% level in the firm performance 
equation). Therefore, the 2SLS model is used in the estimations. The following banking 
relationship equation is estimated simultaneously with the firm performance equation, 
which is explained in detail in the next part. 
 
 
 
The banking relationship variable, NUMBERB, indicates the total number of all 
banking relationships that a firm maintains at the end of the year. Ongena and Şendeniz-
Yüncü (2011) argue that bank characteristics, such as size, nationality, ownership 
structure and orientation, determine attractiveness of a bank to a firm. They find that 
young, large, multiple-bank, and industry-diversified firms that are located in or close to 
Istanbul have a relationship with foreign banks. They also show that Islamic banks 
mainly deal with young, multiple-bank, industry-focused and transparent firms. To 
examine how firm characteristics affect the number of banking relationships for 
different bank types, banks are classified into five groups based on their nationality, 
ownership structure and orientation as state-owned, foreign, private domestic and 
participation (Islamic) banks. The model is estimated for these different types of banks. 
Therefore, in addition to the variable NUMBERB, following banking relationship 
variables are used in the model as dependent variables: 
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 NUMBERF=the number of foreign banks 
 NUMBERS=the number of state-owned banks 
 NUMBERP=the number of private domestic banks 
 NUMBERI=the number of participation (Islamic) banks 
 
Each banking relationship variable indicates the number of banks that a firm has a 
relationship at the end of each year.  
 
In 2003, there were two domestic banks that are under the control of Savings Deposit 
Insurance Funds
1
 (SDIF)in the Turkish banking system. For the rest of the sample 
period, there was only one bank under such control. Therefore, 90% of the total 
observations do not have any relationship with these two banks controlled by SDIF and 
there is not enough observation for an interpretable estimation. As a solution, while 
categorizing banks, I consider including these two banks into other bank categories. 
However, these banks cannot be classified as private domestic banks since SDIF had 
taken their control and they either cannot be state-owned banks since their lending 
activities occurred when these banks were private. For this reason, through this thesis, 
although the number of relationship with the banks controlled by SDIF is included into 
the observations related to the variable NUMBERB, they are not separately analyzed 
when the factors affecting the number of relationships with different bank types are 
examined. 
                                                          
1
 These are the bankrupted banks that are controlled by SDIF, after the Turkish banking crisis in 2001. 
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In the banking relationship model, the relationship between firm performance and the 
number of banks is investigated. Therefore, the major explanatory variable of interest is 
firm performance. In the literature, theoretical models indicate different relationships 
between firm performance and the number of banks. For example, the studies of Rajan 
(1992) and von Thadden (1995) show that having multiple number of banking 
relationships enhances firm performance by reducing holdup costs. On the other hand, 
Yosha (1995) and Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995) indicate that having a single banking 
relationship enhances firm performance by reducing the costs resulting from private 
information leakage when firms maintain multiple number of banking relationships. 
Empirical studies also do not provide clear-cut finding about the impact of the number 
of banking relationship on firm performance. For example, Detragiache et al. (2000) and 
Tirri (2007) find that there is no relationship between firm profitability, measured by 
gross operating margin divided by sales, and the number of banking relationships, in 
Italy. However, Ziane (2003), and Harhoff and Körting (1998a) observe a negative 
relationship between firm profitability and the number of banks in France and Germany 
respectively. Therefore, I do not have any a priori expectation about its sign. As a 
robustness check, I also estimate the model by using Basic Earnings Power Ratio (BEP 
ratio) as a measure of firm performance. This ratio measures firm profitability without 
the influence of taxes or financial leverage. BEP ratio is calculated by dividing earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to total assets. 
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Table 2: Expected Sign of The Explanatory and Control Variables in Their Relation  
With Banking Relationship Variables 
 
Explanatory & 
Control Variables 
Banking Relationship Variables (Dependent Variables) 
RELATION=1 MULTIPLE=1 NUMBERB NUMBERS NUMBERF NUMBERP NUMBERI 
Return on Asset 
(ROA), "Firm 
Performance" 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Firm Age, "AGE" + - ? ? - ? - 
Firm Size, "SIZE" + + + + + + + 
Innovativeness of 
the Firm, 
"INNOVA" 
- ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Firm Leverage, 
"LEVERAGE" 
+ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Level of liabilities 
other than bank 
loans, "NONFIN" 
- - - - - - - 
Group 
Membership, 
"GROUP" (0,1) 
- - - - - - - 
Firm-Bank 
Relatedness, 
"BMEMBER" (0,1) 
- - - - - - - 
Multinational Firm, 
"MNC" (0,1) 
+ + ? - + - - 
Incentive, 
"INCENT" (0,1) 
- - - - - - - 
Belongingness to a 
Governmental 
Entity “STATE” 
(0.1) 
- - ? + - - - 
The sign of the coefficient of the variable is expected to be 
+ positive 
- negative 
? uncertain 
 
The control variables included in the banking relationship model and the rationales 
behind their inclusions are similar to those in the probit models. As Table 2 summarizes, 
the expected signs of the coefficient of these control variables in the banking 
relationship equations are almost the same with the ones in the probit model that uses 
MULTIPLE as a dependent variable, with few exceptions. I expect that the number of 
banking relationships increases with firm size and decreases with the level of liabilities 
other than bank loans, belonging to a group or a holding, related banking and any 
incentive provided by the government. There is not any a priori expectation for 
innovativeness and leverage. The expected coefficients on control variables AGE, MNC 
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and STATE are slightly different depending on the dependent variable used in the 
model. 
 
Unlike the expected negative relationship between firm age and the probability of 
having multiple banking relationships, the relationship between firm age and the 
banking relationship variables NUMBERB, NUMBERS and NUMBERP might be 
either positive or negative. In general, older firms have less need to maintain multiple 
banking relationships, since they are better known and thereby face fewer information 
asymmetry problems in the market. However, considering that establishing a banking 
relationship takes time, older firms may also have more banking relationships than 
young firms. Therefore, the coefficient of this variable is uncertain in its relationship 
with the dependent variables NUMBERB, NUMBERS and NUMBERP. Apart from 
these, following Ongena and Şendeniz-Yüncü (2011), I expect a negative relationship 
between firm age and the dependent variables NUMBERF and NUMBERI. 
 
The relationship between STATE and number of banking relationships can differ, when 
banks are differentiated according to their ownership structure as private and state-
owned ones. If any government entity is a shareholder of a firm, then it will be easier to 
establish a banking relationship with a state-owned bank. Thus, such firms may have 
more relationships with state-owned banks, but less with other types of banks. Such 
firms may even, in total, have a small number of banking relationships relative to other 
firms, since they prefer to maintain banking relationships with only state-owned banks. 
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Therefore, I expect STATE to be positively related to the number of state-owned banks, 
but negatively related to other banking relationship variables. 
 
Similarly, the relationship between MNC and the number of banking relationships can 
be different, when banks are categorized as domestic and foreign. A multinational firm 
can maintain more foreign banking relationships while establishing fewer relationships 
with domestic ones. Therefore, I expect MNC to be positively related to the number of 
foreign banking relationships and negatively related to the number of domestic banks. 
Furthermore, if these two opposite effects offset each other’s impact, the coefficient of 
MNC may not be significant in the model for the total number of banking relationships, 
NUMBERB. 
 
 
3.1.3. Model for Firm Performance 
 
I examine whether the number of banking relationships has any impact on firm 
performance using the following model: 
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The dependent variable, Firm Performance, refers to firm profitability measured with 
ROA or BEP. The variable of interest, Banking Relationship, is the number of banks 
that a firm has either cash and/or non-cash credit relationship with at the end of the year. 
It is measured with five banking relationship variables. NUMBERB indicates the total 
number of banking relationships and the others indicate the number of banking 
relationships depending on banks’ nationality, ownership structure and orientation. 
 
I don’t have a priori expectation about the sign of the coefficient on all the banking 
relationship variables, except NUMBERF, because of the conflicting theoretical 
implications in the literature. Some studies indicates that there would be a positive 
relationship if multiple bank relationships reduce borrowing costs, incentives for 
strategic default, liquidity risks associated with the fragility of the banking system in a 
country or the probability of premature liquidation of a project. On the other hand, other 
studies suggest that there would also be a negative relationship between the number of 
banks and firm performance if multiple bank relationships increase monitoring, 
screening or renegotiation costs arising from information asymmetries between a bank 
and a firm or increase the risk of private information disclosure about a firm. Fok et al. 
(2004) show that there is a negative relationship between the number of domestic banks 
and firm performance but a positive relationship between the number of foreign banks 
and firm performance. Therefore, it is expected that firm performance increases with the 
number of foreign banking relationships, NUMBERF. However, this positive 
relationship may disappear during the crisis periods if foreign banks and firms are too 
sensitive to the economic and financial deteriorations during the crisis periods. 
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As an additional control variable, only LIQUIDITY is included in the model in order to 
solve the identification problem in the 2SLS estimation model. To control for year and 
industry effects, industry and calendar year dummy variables,  respectively, are 
included in the model.  represents the disturbance term. 
 
The age of a firm, AGE, is included in the model to capture the length of the firm 
achievement. Because of the nature of business life cycle, investment opportunities may 
be limited in latter stages and firm performance is expected to diminish as a firm gets 
older. I expect a negative relationship between firm age and firm performance. 
 
SIZE and performance is expected to be negatively related if the size of a firm causes a 
decrease in firm performance because of diseconomies or an increase in agency 
problems. Conversely, this variable can also be positively related to firm performance if 
the size of a firm enhances it by raising the market power of a firm or making easy to 
find capital. Therefore, the sign of the coefficient of firm size is ambiguous. 
 
The relationship between the innovativeness of a firm, INNOVA, and firm performance 
is also uncertain. If a firm invests in a project by increasing its R&D expenditures, its 
profitability can be low or even negative in early times of the investment. However, a 
firm may also enjoy high profit in the latter stages of investment, if the project brings 
higher returns. Therefore, the coefficient of this variable can be positive or negative 
depending on the stage in the investment project. 
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The sign of the coefficient of LEVERAGE can be positive or negative because leverage 
may affect firm performance in different ways under the presence of market 
imperfections such as agency conflicts or informational asymmetries, etc. (Harris and 
Raviv, 1991). For example, using an agency conflict model, Chang (1992) predicts a 
negative relationship between leverage and firm performance, while several other 
studies argue a positive relationship between leverage and firm value (e.g., Hirshleifer 
and Thakor, 1992; Stulz, 1990). 
 
In Turkey, almost all of the holding companies own a bank within their group. I expect 
that if a firm is a member of such an industrial group, then it may more easily obtain 
funding from that bank. This borrowing relation is called “related lending” in the 
literature. Therefore, I also add the dummy variable of BMEMBER into the 
performance model. However, the relationship between firm performance and related 
lending is ambiguous. On the one hand, according to “informational view” arguments, 
related banks can more easily access the true quality of the investment projects, and they 
may force firms to give up bad investments and invest only in good projects. Thus, they 
may improve firm performance (Rajan, 1992). On the other hand, according to “looting” 
(Akerlof and Romer, 1993) and “tunneling” (Johnson, La Porta, López-de-Silanes and 
Shleifer, 2000) arguments, a close relationship between a group bank and a firm may 
allow insiders to obtain resources from depositors even when a firm is in a bad financial 
condition. Therefore, the sign of the coefficient of BMEMBER in the firm performance 
equation is not known a priori. 
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LIQUIDITY refers the liquidity ratio of a firm and is calculated as current assets divided 
by current liabilities. I include this variable in the model to solve the identification 
problem that occurs when firm performance and banking relationship equations are 
simultaneously estimated. Literature suggests that “rank condition” is the necessary and 
sufficient condition for identification in a two-equation simultaneous estimation model 
(Green, 2011). “Rank condition” states that the first model is identified if and only if the 
second model equation includes at least one exogenous variable with nonzero 
coefficient which is excluded from the first equation. To satisfy this “rank condition,” 
LIQUIDITY is added to the firm performance model and its coefficient is expected to be 
non-zero, since the relationship between firm liquidity and profitability is frequently 
emphasized in the literature. For example, Smith (1980) states that a large increase in 
profitability level would tend to reduce firm’s liquidity and similarly, a large increase in 
liquidity level would tend to negatively affect the profitability. Eljelly (2004), and 
Raheman and Nasr (2007) find a significant negative relationship for a sample of Saudi 
and Pakistani firms, respectively. On the other hand, Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano 
(2007), and Gill, Biger and Mathur (2010) show that with a correct liquidity 
management strategy, managers can create profit for their firms in Spain and US, 
respectively. Thus, I do not have a priori expectation about the sign of the coefficient of 
LIQUIDITY. 
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3.2. Data 
 
The models are estimated for a sample of firms that are publicly traded in the National 
market of the BIST over the period2003-2011. Firms traded on the Secondary national, 
watch-list and emerging companies markets are not included in the sample. There are a 
total of358 firms traded on the national market during the sample period. 136 financial 
firms and holding companies are excluded from the sample. The financial years of some 
companies, e.g., sport clubs, ends in other months of the year, are not in December. 
Thus, seven firms that do not have compatible financial statements are omitted from the 
sample. Since I cannot get the number of banking relationships for one foreign 
company, Do&Co Restaurants and Catering A.G., I also omit it from the sample. Lastly, 
because I cannot acquire financial statements of one bankrupt company, Anadolu Gıda 
Dağıtım A.Ş., I also remove it from the sample. The final sample consists of 212 
publicly traded firms and 1663 firm-year observations. The data is an unbalanced panel 
since the number of firms changes by year as the new firms started to be traded or the 
existing ones become delisted. I do not use a balanced one in order to avoid survivorship 
bias. 
 
Financial statements are obtained from the official web sites of BIST and PDP. Market 
values of firms are taken from Datastream. Over the sample period, firms are allowed to 
report their financial statements in different forms: consolidated and standard. If 
companies control one or more subsidiaries, they are legally required to prepare a 
consolidated financial statement. Moreover, before 2005, it was mandatory for firms 
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traded in the BIST to report inflation adjusted financial statements. But after 2005, as 
the inflation rate has started to decrease, the rule of preparing inflation adjusted financial 
statements is nullified. It becomes mandatory for these firms to prepare financial 
statements using International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). In this analysis, 
the consolidated financial statements are used as a source of financial data, because if a 
firm has one or more subsidiaries, then it may take out a loan instead of its subsidiaries, 
increasing the number of banking relationships. However, such relationships will not be 
observed if a non-consolidated financial statement is used for this firm. Then, there 
would be an inconsistency between the number of banking relationships and financial 
statements data. To avoid such an inconsistency, I use consolidated financial statements 
as first choice. If there is no consolidated financial statement for a firm, then 
unconsolidated ones are used. 
 
I find the data about the incentives obtained from the government from the official web 
site of BIST and PDP by searching publicly available archives of “Company 
Notifications” that are announced over the sample period. While searching “Company 
Notifications,” I use the key words “incentive, investment and subsidy/subsidies.” Then, 
I confirm this data from the footnotes of audited financial statements of companies. 
 
The data about the number of banking relationships are obtained from the BRSA. The 
availability and reliability of this data determines the beginning of the sample period 
(2003). This dataset provides the number of banks that a firm has a relationship at the 
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end of the year. Therefore, if a firm has a relationship with a bank during the year but 
not the end of the year, this relationship is not reported in the dataset. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables Used in the Analysis 
 
Variables N Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. Minimum Maximum 
B
a
n
k
in
g
 R
el
a
ti
o
n
sh
ip
 
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s 
RELATION 1663 0.91 1 0.28 0 1 
MULTIPLE 1515 0.92 0 0.27 0 1 
NUMBERB 1663 5.60 5 4.23 0 23 
NUMBERP 1663 3.39 3 2.43 0 16 
NUMBERF 1663 1.10 1 1.46 0 9 
NUMBERS 1663 0.88 0 1.11 0 4 
NUMBERI 1663 0.13 0 0.50 0 4 
NUMBERT 1663 0.10 0 0.31 0 2 
O
th
er
 V
a
ri
a
b
le
s 
ROA 1663 0.03 0.03 0.11 -1.25 0.58 
BEP ratio 1663 0.05 0.05 0.10 -0.49 0.55 
ROE 1622 -0.01 0.06 0.59 -16.56 6.73 
GROUP 1663 0.71 1 0.45 0 1 
BMEMBER 1663 0.20 0 0.40 0 1 
STATE 1663 0.04 0 0.19 0 1 
INCENT 1663 0.48 0 0.50 0 1 
AGE* 1663 34.40 35 13.57 4 80 
SIZE (MV)** 1663 652.14 113.00 2,100 4.00 28,160 
LEVERAGE 1663 0.47 0.43 0.31 0.02 3.82 
GROWTHOPP 1663 0.01 0.00 0.03 0 0.63 
LIQUIDITY 1663 2.33 1.58 2.86 0.10 70.59 
NONFIN 1663 0.69 0.70 0.24 0.02 1 
* Age in years 
** SIZE(MV) is measured with market value of a firm at the end of the year(in million TL) 
 
Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis are presented in Table 3.The 
mean and median numbers are close to each other for all variables, except LIQUIDITY 
and SIZE. Considering the banking relationship variables, there is a wide variation in 
the number of banking relationships for Turkish firms. Only 9% of the observations in 
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the sample do not maintain any banking relationships. For those which have any 
banking relationships, 8% of them maintain a single banking relationship. The 
remaining 92% of these observations have multiple banking relationships. The median 
number of banking relationships is 5 and it is similar to the ones found for Austria 
(Ongena and Smith, 2000b), France (Refait, 2003), Germany (Elsas and Krahnen, 
1998), and Japan (Tsuruta, 2008). When banks are categorized, the most preferable bank 
types are the private domestic banks with the median number of banks of 3. On average, 
firms have relationship with 1.1 foreign banks, 0.88 state-owned banks and 0.13 
participation banks. These numbers can be partially explained with the number of banks 
existing by each bank type. As it is shown in Table 4, before 2007, the private domestic 
banks dominate the market, constituting almost one-half of the total number of banks in 
Turkey. After 2007, the number of foreign banks increased to more than 20 and they 
started to dominate the market. 
 
Table 4: Total Number of Banks Operated in Turkey 
 
Bank Type 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
State-owned banks 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Domestic banks controlled by SDIF 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Private domestic banks 26 26 25 20 17 17 17 17 17 
Foreign banks 16 15 15 19 22 21 21 21 20 
Participation (Islamic) banks 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Total 54 52 51 50 50 49 49 49 48 
Source: http://www.tbb.org.tr/en/home          
 
 
Firm performance, ROA, changes between -1.25 and 0.58, indicating that there are both 
positively and negatively performed firms in the sample. The mean ROA indicates that 
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on average, firms in the sample perform with 3% profitability ratio over the sample 
period. The mean and median BEP ratio is 5% which is slightly higher than the mean 
and median ROA (3%). The mean ROE is negative, whereas the median ROE is 6%. 
The mean value of GROUP indicates that 71% of the observations in the sample come 
from firms that belong to a group or a holding. The mean value of BMEMBER shows 
that 20% of the observations obtained from firms that have a membership in such a 
group that owns a bank. This indicates that these firms in the sample can more easily 
find funds from the bank in their group. On the other hand, only 4% of the sample is 
related to a governmental entity. Moreover, on average, almost half of the sample gets 
some kind of incentive from the government entities during the sample period 2003-
2011. 
 
The difference between the minimum and maximum values of the other control 
variables indicates that the firms in the sample have structural differences. For instance, 
there are both new established and mature companies, with an average age of 34 years. 
Also, there are both high and low leveraged firms in the sample. The average debt ratio 
(leverage) is 47%, which is lower than the mean debt ratio (61%) presented in the study 
of Cakova (2011). The minimum and maximum value of NONFIN indicates that at least 
one firm uses bank loans to finance 98% of its debt, whereas at least one firm does not 
use any bank loan. On average, 69% of the all liabilities are borrowed from external 
sources other than banks. 
 
59 
 
Table 5 shows how the number of banking relationships changes over the sample period. 
In general, there is an increase in the mean value of NUMBERB over time. However, 
this increase cannot be fully explained by the change in the number of banks operating 
in Turkey, since the total number of banks decreases from 54to 48over time, as Table 4 
indicates. 
 
 
 
In contrast to the general increase in the number of banking relationships, the number of 
firms with no banking relationship increases over the sample period. Furthermore, as 
Table 5 shows, there is a decline in the number of banking relationships in 2007 and 
2010, compared to the previous years. The number of banking relationships increased in 
2008, when the 2008 global financial crisis started to affect the Turkish economic and 
financial sectors. To investigate whether the mean number of banking relationships 
varies in crisis and non-crisis years, I separate the sample period into two. Table 6 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 >15 Max Mean
2003 14 9 23 28 14 15 17 29 11 8 2 5 2 2 2 3 18 5.09 184
2004 14 13 23 18 16 13 27 11 16 13 10 5 2 2 3 4 19 5.47 190
2005 15 14 15 24 19 11 25 17 14 11 8 4 3 5 2 5 20 5.54 192
2006 18 18 11 22 19 18 17 17 12 8 5 4 7 6 1 9 20 5.61 192
2007 17 17 17 21 21 17 20 15 9 6 3 9 4 2 5 6 23 5.35 189
2008 17 14 12 28 14 16 17 8 8 11 4 3 8 5 3 10 21 5.72 178
2009 16 14 11 28 15 19 16 10 7 7 4 8 7 5 3 9 18 5.74 179
2010 18 9 22 23 22 13 14 8 7 6 8 5 3 9 3 11 19 5.71 181
2011 19 12 14 21 13 11 17 10 9 14 4 4 5 4 5 16 21 6.25 178
Total (%) 8.90 7.22 8.90 12.81 9.20 8.00 10.22 7.52 5.59 5.05 2.89 2.83 2.47 2.41 1.62 4.39
N
NUMBERB
YEAR
Table 5: Total Number of Banking Relationships Over Time
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presents how the mean values of the number of banking relationships change in these 
two sub-periods based on firm size. 
 
 
 
 
Without separating firms as small- and large-sized, it is found that the mean numbers of 
banking relationships are significantly different in crisis and non-crisis years for only 
state-owned, foreign and private domestic banks. However, the mean values change in 
opposite directions. While the mean value of the number of relationship with state-
owned and foreign banks increases in crisis years, the mean value of the number of 
relationship with private domestic banks decreases. These two opposite changes 
offsetting each other’s effects can be the reason why there is no significant difference in 
the mean values of the total number of banking relationships. When firms are 
categorized based on their size as small- and large-sized ones, these differences are still 
significant for both small- and large-sized firms, except small-sized ones that have 
relationship with private domestic banks. However, the significance levels of these 
differences are much higher for large-sized firms that have a relationship with state-
Small Large Total Small Large Total Small Large Total
NUMBERB 4.9124 6.2229 5.5697 5.2291 6.2360 5.7311 0.3316 0.9726 0.5233
NUMBERS 0.6928 0.9573 0.8254 0.8771 1.2753 1.0756 0.0363 0.0011 0.0002
NUMBERF 0.8433 1.1863 1.0153 1.257 1.6067 1.4314 0.0009 0.0023 <.0001
NUMBERP 3.1562 3.8244 3.4916 2.8833 3.1573 3.0224 0.1799 0.0013 0.0005
NUMBERI 0.1367 0.1237 0.1302 0.1508 0.1292 0.1401 0.7278 0.8983 0.7417
P-values to test the equality of 
mean values in crisis and non-
crisis years using t-statistics
Table 6: The Number of Banking Relationships in Crisis and Non-Crisis Years
CRSIS=0 CRISIS=1
Mean Values
CRISIS=1: firms that operate in crisis time (2008 & 2009), 0: otherwise
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owned and private domestic banks but lower for large-sized firms that have a 
relationship with foreign banks. 
 
Table 7 shows the distribution of the number of banking relationships according to the 
industry within which firms operate. The maximum and mean values of NUMBERB 
present wide variability among industries. On average, the mean number of banking 
relationships is highest (7.52) in the transportation, communication and storage sector 
(SEC8),and lowest (1.45) in the mining sector (SEC5).   
 
 
 
The mean number of banking relationships does not depend on the number of firms that 
operate in that sector. Each sector is not equally represented in the sample. For example, 
almost 80% of the sample is from the manufacturing sector (SEC3) and the firms in this 
industry have an average of 5.82 number of banking relationships. On the other hand, 
the sector of construction and prosperity (SEC4) generates only 1.20% of the sample but 
the mean number of banking relationships is 7.45 for the firms operating in this sector. 
This indicates that average number of banking relationships in a sector cannot be 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 >15 Max Mean
E 1 4 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1.45 11 0.66
A 0 11 4 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 1.59 17 1.02
F 20 10 7 1 5 11 11 9 1 4 3 1 0 2 1 0 14 4.14 86 5.17
B 11 1 3 7 2 0 5 1 3 1 0 0 1 0 1 2 20 4.50 38 2.29
G 17 12 23 22 8 10 5 4 1 1 1 1 2 1 5 9 17 4.50 122 7.34
C 97 81 104 169 131 103 145 107 88 76 42 41 33 31 19 56 23 5.82 1323 79.56
D 2 0 0 3 1 2 1 2 0 1 1 2 2 2 0 1 15 7.45 20 1.20
H 0 1 1 11 4 7 3 2 0 1 1 2 3 4 1 5 18 7.52 46 2.77
Table 7: Disribution of the Total Number of Banking Relationships According to Industries
SEC1: education, health, sport and other social services; SEC2: electricity, gas and water; SEC3: manufacturing; 
SEC4: construction and prosperity; SEC5: mining; SEC6: technology; SEC7: wholesalers, retailers, hotels and restaurants;
SEC8: transportation, communication and storage
MSECTOR
NUMBERB
N
Percent
(% )
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explained by the number of firms operating in that sector, but something unique to that 
sector or the firms operating in that sector, e.g., average debt ratio etc. 
 
Lastly, Table 8 shows correlation coefficients between all variables used in the analysis. 
The significantly highest correlation (40%) is between liquidity and leverage. Beside 
this, there is also a relatively high correlation between SIZE and ROA, NONFIN and 
LEVERAGE, STATE and GROUP. However, none of the significant correlations are 
greater than 50%. When the correlations of control variables with the banking 
relationship variables are examined, it is seen that almost all signs of correlations are 
compatible with the expectations presented in Table 2.  
 
All the control variables, except BMEMBER, LEVERAGE and MNC, have significant 
correlations with NUMBERB. However, when banks are differentiated according to 
their nationalities, ownership structures and orientations, the type and the significance of 
the correlations between these control variables and the number of relationships with 
these different bank types changes. For example, while AGE is positively and 
significantly correlated with all banking relationship variables, except NUMBERI. The 
correlation coefficient between firm age and the number of relationships with 
participation banks is negative and significant, suggesting that young firms work with 
participation banks. The preliminary evidence about the control variables indicates that 
the determinants of banking relationships may change by bank types. 
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Table 8 also presents the correlations of control variables with firm performance. Firm 
performance measure, ROA, is significantly correlated with only the numbers of state-
owned and Islamic banks. Although its correlation with the number of state-owned 
banks is positive, it is negative with the number of Islamic banks. It suggests that firms 
that are not profitable might get credits from participation banks and profitable ones 
might get credits from state-owned banks. The correlation coefficients of ROA with the 
number of other banks are negative but not significant. However, these are correlations 
without controlling for other factors affecting performance of a firm. 
 
Table 8: Pearson Correlation Coefficients of All Variables in the Models, 
 N = 1663, Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0 
 
  NUMBERB NUMBERS NUMBERF NUMBERP NUMBERI NUMBERT 
NUMBERB 1 0.643*** 0.77304*** 0.86907*** 0.39387*** 0.26358*** 
NUMBERS   1 0.42102*** 0.34994*** 0.22539*** 0.12585*** 
NUMBERF     1 0.47889*** 0.28264*** 0.13243*** 
NUMBERP       1 0.20468*** 0.19154*** 
NUMBERI         1 0.01775 
NUMBERT           1 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 
 
4.1. Results of the Probit Model for the Probability of Having a Banking 
Relationships 
 
In this section, I investigate first the probability of having a banking relationship 
(RELATION=1) and then the probability of having multiple banking relationships 
(MULTIPLE=1) for Turkish firms.  
 
The results of these two estimations are presented in Table 9. The first two columns of 
the table show the results of the estimation for the firm’s probability of having a banking 
relationship where the dependent variable is RELATION. The last two columns show 
the results of the probit model for the firm’s probability of having a single or a multiple 
banking relationships. The first and third columns present the estimated coefficients
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with p-values in parenthesis. Marginal effects on the second level of the response, 
RELATION=1 and MULTIPLE=1 are also presented in the second and fourth columns, 
respectively. They are estimated at the mean values of the continuous variables and a 
single change from 0 to 1 for dummy variables. These marginal effects indicate how 
much the probability of having a banking relationship changes when the mean value of a 
control variable changes by one percent or when a dummy variable changes from 0 to 1. 
 
There are 1663 observations used to estimate the probability of having a banking 
relationship model. There are 148 observations with no banking relationships so, the 
number of observations declines to 1515 for the estimation of single/multiple 
relationships. It is found that AGE, SIZE, LEVERAGE, INCENT, NONFIN, GROUP 
and MNC are significant factors affecting the probability of having a banking 
relationship. Other firm characteristics, firm performance, innovativeness of a firm, 
belonging to a group or a holding and state ownership of a firm, are not found to be 
significant factors at the 10% level. The signs of the coefficients of SIZE, LEVERAGE 
and AGE are compatible with the expected signs presented in the Table 2, but the sign 
of the coefficient of INCENT is not. It is found that an increase in size, age, leverage, 
debt ratio or having any kind of incentive from any governmental entity increases the 
probability of maintaining a banking relationship. A 1% increase in the mean value of 
AGE creates the largest change (4.48% increase) in the probability of having a banking 
relationship. Although the coefficient of ROA is not found to be significant, a 1% 
increase in ROA and a 1% increase in the size of a firm have almost similar effect on the 
probability of having a banking relationship.  
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The coefficients of NONFIN, GROUP and MNC are found to be negative and 
significant. The level of significance is 1% for GROUP and is 10% for NONFIN and 
MNC. As expected, the ability of obtaining funding from other external sources and 
belonging to a group or a holding mitigates the probability of having a banking 
relationship by about 4%. Interestingly, the sign of the coefficient of MNC is negative. 
This means that being a multinational company does not increase the probability of 
having a banking relationship, but reduces it. It seems that multinational firms might 
have alternative funding resourced rather than maintaining a relationship with a bank in 
Turkey. Its marginal effect (1.39%) is smaller than the marginal effects of NONFIN and 
GROUP (2.98% and 4.02% respectively). 
 
Industry and year effects are included in the model and their estimated coefficients are 
presented in Table 9. Transportation, communication and storage industry (SEC8) and 
the year 2011 are selected as base industry and base year in the estimations. No 
significant difference is observed among industries compared to the base industry. When 
marginal effects of the industry coefficients are examined, it is found that in all 
industries, except education, health, sport and other social services sector (SEC1), the 
probability of having a banking relationship is more than 60% lower than in base 
industry. However, the equality of the coefficients of industry variables is tested and 
rejected at the 10% significance level. This means that although the coefficients of 
industry variables are not significantly different from zero, their effects are not equal. 
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The coefficients of the year variables indicate that in the earlier years of the sample 
period (2003-2005), firms have a higher probability of having a banking relationship 
compared 2011. However, the hypothesis about the equality of the coefficients of the 
year variables to zero is tested but not rejected. This indicates that there is no significant 
difference among the years in terms of the probability of having a banking relationship. 
 
 
Table 9: Probit Estimations 
 
Parameters 
RELATION=1 MULTIPLE=1 
Estimation 
(Pr > |t|) 
Meff 
RELATION=1 
Estimation 
(Pr > |t|) 
Meff 
MULTIPLE=1 
Intercept 3.4423 - 1.4491 - 
 (.9783)  (.0371)  
ROA 0.4630 0.0280 0.2414 0.0187 
 (.3433)  (.6661)  
AGE 0.7394 0.0448 -0.0164 -0.0013 
 (.0053)  (.9576)  
SIZE 0.4594 0.0278 0.4011 0.0310 
 (<.0001)  (.0003)  
INNOVA 0.6065 0.0367 0.6872 0.0532 
 (.6348)  (.6246)  
LEVERAGE 0.6822 0.0413 0.4460 0.0345 
 (.0037)  (.0663)  
NONFIN -0.4929 -0.0298 -0.9095 -0.0704 
 (.042)  (.0003)  
GROUP -0.6649 -0.0402 -0.4220 -0.0327 
 (<.0001)  (.0033)  
BMEMBER -0.0912 -0.0055 -0.2738 -0.0212 
 (.5421)  (.0739)  
MNC -0.2295 -0.0139 -0.1142 -0.0088 
 (.0682)  (.3807)  
INCENT 0.4914 0.0297 0.2548 0.0197 
 (<.0001)  (.0244)  
STATE -0.1223 -0.0074 4.3850 0.3532 
 (.7484)  (.9807)  
69 
 
Table 9: Probit Estimations (cont’d) 
 
Parameters 
RELATION=1 MULTIPLE=1 
Estimation 
(Pr > |t|) 
Meff 
RELATION=1 
Estimation 
(Pr > |t|) 
Meff 
MULTIPLE=1 
SEC1 -0.4223 -0.0427 -2.6643 -0.2061 
 (.9987)  (<.0001)  
SEC2 -4.5104 -0.6646 -0.2707 -0.0209 
 (.9716)  (.676)  
SEC3 -3.8545 -0.6249 -0.1028 -0.0080 
 (.9757)  (.826)  
SEC4 -3.7792 -0.6203 4.4050 0.3549 
 (.9762)  (.9893)  
SEC5 -3.8711 -0.6259 -1.5280 -0.1182 
 (.9756)  (.0133)  
SEC6 -4.4750 -0.6625 -0.8719 -0.0675 
 (.9718)  (.0846)  
SEC7 -4.0351 -0.6358 -0.4146 -0.0321 
 (.9746)  (.398)  
YEAR03 0.5605 0.0339 0.4405 0.0341 
 (.011)  (.075)  
YEAR04 0.4577 0.0277 0.2516 0.0195 
 (.0324)  (.2809)  
YEAR05 0.3490 0.0211 0.0879 0.0068 
 (.0913)  (.6925)  
YEAR06 0.2040 0.0123 -0.0714 -0.0055 
 (.3032)  (.7412)  
YEAR07 0.2245 0.0136 -0.0427 -0.0033 
 (.2584)  (.8435)  
YEAR08 0.3133 0.0190 0.1297 0.0100 
 (.1278)  (.5721)  
YEAR09 0.2531 0.0153 0.0374 0.0029 
 (.2128)  (.8675)  
YEAR10 0.0322 0.0019 0.2154 0.0167 
 (.87)  (.3732)  
Likelihood 
Ratio Test 
165.94  131.34  
(<.0001)   (<.0001)   
** Ho: SEC1=...=SEC7=0 is tested. It is rejected at 10% significance level, in the first 
estimation (Chi-square value=12.48) and at 1% significance level, in the second estimation 
(Chi-square value=12.48) 
** Ho: YEAR1=…=YEAR8=0 is tested and cannot be rejected in both estimations. 
P-values are reported in parenthesis. 
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In estimating the probability of having a single or multiple banking relationships, the 
firms with zero banking relationship are excluded from the sample, resulting in 1515 
observations. There are 120 observations with a single banking relationship and the rest 
maintains multiple banking relationships. The variables SIZE, LEVERAGE, NONFIN, 
GROUP, BMEMBER and INCENT are found to be significant in the model for the 
probability of having multiple banking relationships. The coefficients of obtaining 
incentives from the government, firm size and leverage are positive. This indicates that 
as size and leverage of a firm increase or a firm obtains an incentive from the 
government, the probability of having multiple banking relationships increases 
significantly. However, the size of these increases is different. For example, while the 
probability of having multiple relationships is expected to increase 3% when there is a 
1% increase in the mean size and leverage values, it is expected to increase about 2% 
when a firm obtains an incentive from the government. 
 
Like the results of the model for having a banking relationship, the coefficients of 
NONFIN and GROUP are found to be negative and significant at the 1% level. These 
findings suggest that firms that have an ability of obtaining funds from other external 
sources or a group or a holding are likely to have a single banking relationship rather 
than multiple banking relationships. Marginal effect values in the last column shows that 
a 1% increase in the mean values of NONFIN decreases the probability of having more 
than one banking relationship by 7.04%. Similarly, the probability of having multiple 
banking relationships decreases by 3.27%, if a firm is a member of a group or a holding. 
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As in the first probit estimation, firm performance, innovativeness and state ownership 
in a firm are not found to be significantly affecting the probability of having multiple 
banking relationships. Moreover, the factors of firm age and being a multinational 
company surprisingly lose their significance. This indicates that while AGE and MNC 
affect the probability of having a banking relationship, they do not affect the probability 
of maintaining multiple banking relationships significantly.  
 
Similarly, industry and year effects are included in this model and results are presented 
in Table 9. Controlling for firm characteristics and year effects, it is found that firms 
operating in sectors of education, health, sport and other social services (SEC1), mining 
(SEC5) and technology (SEC6) have a significantly lower probability of having multiple 
banking relationships, comparing to firms in the base sector (SEC8). It is expected that 
industries with high R&D expenditures such as technology or health will be more 
affected from information leakage, and therefore firms operating in these industries 
prefer to have a single banking relationship. My findings support this expectation. The 
hypothesis that the coefficients of the industry dummy variables equal to zero is rejected 
at the 1% significance level. So, it is found that the probability of having multiple 
banking relationships differs for firms operating in different industries. With respect to 
the year effect, I fail to reject the hypothesis of the equality of the coefficients of the 
year variables. The significant coefficient is found for year 2003. In 2003, the 
probability of having multiple banking relationships is 3.4%, which is more than the 
probability in 2011. This finding may be explained by the existence of size more banks 
in 2003 than in 2007. 
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There are some similarities and differences between the findings for Turkish firms and 
findings for other countries. For example, although profitability is found to affect the 
probability of having multiple banking relationships in Italy and France (Detragiache et 
al., 2000; Tirri, 2007; Dietsch and Golitin-Boubakari, 2002), no significant effect of 
profitability is found for Turkey.  On the other side, the insignificant relationship 
between firm age and the probability of having multiple banking relationships for 
Turkish firms is similar to the findings of Detragiache et al. (2000), and Tirri (2007), but 
not to the results of Cosci and Meliciani (2002) for Italian firms. Cosci and Meliciani 
(2002) show that the probability of having multiple banking relationships increases as 
firms get older. In addition to this, the findings related to the positive effect of leverage 
on the probability of having multiple banking relationships for Turkish firms is 
compatible with the findings of Tirri (2007) for Italy; and Roberts and Siddiqi (2004) for 
the U.S. All these studies find that the probability of having more than two banking 
relationships increases with an increase in leverage. Lastly, the negative effect of the 
ability of Turkish firms to obtain funding from external sources other than bank loans on 
the probability of having multiple banking relationships is compatible with the results of 
Sterken and Tokutsu (2002) for Japan, but not with the results of Cosci and 
Meliciani(2002) for Italy. Cosci and Meliciani (2002) find that the ratio of debts other 
than bank loans to all debts positively affects the probability of having multiple banking 
relationships in Italy. 
 
To sum up, as firm size and its leverage ratio increase, both the probabilities of having a 
banking relationship and maintaining multiple banking relationships are found to 
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increase significantly for Turkish firms. Interestingly, getting some kind of financial 
incentive from a government agency also increases these two probabilities. There should 
be some mechanism in getting incentive from a governmental entity that creates such an 
increase in these probabilities. For example, the government might provide these 
incentives through banks, such as investment and development banks. This area needs 
further investigation. Moreover, as firms’ ability to obtain funding form external sources 
other than bank loans increases, both the probabilities of having a banking relationship 
and maintaining multiple relationships decreases, as expected. Membership to a group 
or a holding also has a negative effect on these probabilities. Since firms can get funding 
from their parent companies rather than a bank, being in a group that owns a bank 
creates a negative effect only on the probability of having multiple banking 
relationships. Although it is found that older firms are more likely to have a banking 
relationship but multinational firms are less likely to have a banking relationship in 
Turkey. Lastly, profitability and innovativeness of a firm are not found to significantly 
affect these two probabilities. 
 
 
4.2. Results of Banking Relationship Model 
 
In analyzing the factors affecting the number of banking relationship, 2SLS model is 
used and banking relationship equation is simultaneously estimated with the firm 
performance equation. Table 10 presents the results for the banking relationship 
estimations. The dependent variable in these estimations is the number of banking 
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relationships that a firm i has at the end of a year t. Each row in Table 10 shows the 
estimated coefficients and associated p-values for a model with one of the five banking 
relationship measures, i.e., the total number of banking relationships, NUMBERBit, the 
number of relationships with state-owned banks, NUMBERSit, the number of 
relationships with foreign banks, NUMBERFit, the number of relationships with private 
domestic banks, NUMBERPit and the number of relationships with Islamic banks, 
NUMBERIit,. For all estimations, there are 1663 observations. The model explains more 
than 15% of variability in the number of banking relationship. 
 
In Table 10, the first row represents the estimations for the total number of banking 
relationships, NUMBERB. It is found that the coefficient of ROA is negative and 
significant at the 1% level. This suggests that as the profitability of a firm increases, the 
firm has a relationship with a smaller number of banks, controlling for other factors 
affecting the number of banking relationship. This finding is similar to the empirical 
findings of Ziane (2003), and Harhoff and Körting (1998a). Measuring firm profitability 
with the ratio of net income to interest payments, Harhoff and Körting (1998a) find such 
a negative relation between firm performance and the number of banking relationships 
in Germany. Measuring firm profitability with the ratio of operating profitability to 
turnover, Ziane (2003) finds the same result in France. 
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All of the firm characteristics, except INNOVA and LEVERAGE, are found to be 
significant, controlling for industry and year effects. And the sign of the coefficients, 
except the ones for INCENT and STATE, are consistent with the expectations in Table 
2. The variables AGE and SIZE are found to be positively related to NUMBERB, 
indicating that the number of banking relationships increases significantly as firms get 
older and larger. These findings are consistent with many studies that report a positive 
relationship between age and size of a firm and the number of banking relationships 
(e.g., Detragiache et al., 2000; Cosci and Meliciani, 2002; Degryse et al., 2004; Harhoff 
and Körting,1998a). These results support the idea that larger and older firms need more 
banking relationships in order to diversify their credit risks. 
 
When the number of banking relationships is redefined with respect to bank nationality, 
ownership structure and orientations, there are some changes in the findings. For 
example, it is found that although profitability decreases significantly the number of 
foreign bank relationships and the number of private bank relationships, it does not have 
any significant effect on the number of state-owned and Islamic bank relationships. 
These findings suggest that the negative relationship between the number of banking 
relationships and profitability might be driven by the negative relationship between 
profitability and the number of relationships with foreign and private domestic banks. 
 
The age of a firm affects significantly the number of banking relationships of all types 
of banks but in a different way, as expected. The sign of its coefficient turns out to be 
negative in the models with state-owned and Islamic banks. This shows that as firms get 
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older, they maintain fewer relationships with state-owned and participation banks, but 
more relationships with foreign and private domestic banks. The negative relationship 
with Islamic banks is consistent with the findings of Ongena and Şendeniz-Yüncü 
(2011). They also find that Islamic banks in Turkey mainly deal with young firms.  
 
The coefficients of SIZE and NONFIN are significant in all of the banking relationship 
estimations, except NUMBERI, as they are in the model estimating the total number of 
banking relationships. The positive coefficient of the variable SIZE indicates that as the 
size of a firm increases, the number of all types of banking relationships increases. 
Furthermore, there is a negative relationship between the availability of non-bank 
funding and the number of banks, in all estimations. The coefficient of GROUP loses its 
significance only in the model that uses NUMBERF as the dependent variable and 
sustains its significance in other models. This implies that membership to a group or a 
holding is negatively related to the number of domestic banks, while it is not related to 
the number of relationships with foreign banks. Interestingly, firms that are associated 
with a group that owns a bank have a significantly lower number of relationships with 
foreign or domestic banks, but have a significantly higher number of relationships with 
state-owned banks. 
 
Interestingly, the coefficient of LEVERAGE is found to be significant only in the model 
for the number of state-owned banking relationship. This finding can be explained by 
the government policy of lending credits especially to leveraged firms in order to 
support the economy. Besides, this finding shows that if a firm is highly levered, then it 
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might prefer to continue to borrow from their existing private and domestic banks rather 
than searching for new ones. The level of innovativeness of a firm is found to be 
negatively related to the number of private domestic banks. It is significant only at the 
10% level. 
 
The state-owned listed companies are found to have significantly more relationships 
with state-owned and participation banks relative to other listed firms. However, no 
significant coefficient of STATE is observed for other types of banking relationships. 
Although the positive relationship between state-owned banks and state-owned firms is 
expected, the positive relationship with Islamic banks might be explained by the policy 
of the government to increase the importance of the participation banks in the economy. 
 
The base industry in these estimations is the sector of transportation, communication 
and storage (SEC8). The coefficients of industry variables should be interpreted relative 
to this industry. It is found that firms operating in all other industries have a relationship 
with a smaller number of banks than those operating in TCS. However, only sectors of 
education, health, sport and other social services (SEC1), and electricity, gas and water 
(SEC2) are found to be significantly lower. When the estimations are performed with 
respect to bank types, some differences among industries are found. For example, firms 
in the sector of education, health, sport and other social services (SEC1) have smaller 
number of relationships with state-owned banks, but those in the sector of 
manufacturing (SEC3) have a larger number of relationships with state-owned banks. 
Firms in other sectors have a smaller number of private domestic banking relationships, 
79 
 
except firms in technology industry (SEC3). Moreover, firms in all sectors have a 
significantly lower number of relationships with participant banks, than firms in SEC8. 
Lastly, firms in the sector of construction and prosperity (SEC4) have a larger number 
of relationships with foreign banks than those in SEC8. 
 
The base year in the model is 2011. It is found that there is no significant difference in 
the total number of banking relationships among years but in 2010, there is significantly 
lower number of relationships than in 2011. However, there are some significant 
differences among years when the relationship with different bank types are examined. 
Over the period 2003-2007, firms maintain significantly a smaller number of 
relationships with state-owned banks, with a significance level of 1%. Similarly, the 
number of relationships with Islamic banks is significantly lower in all years than in 
2011. In contrast, I find that the number of relationship with private domestic banks is 
higher in period 2003-2006 but lower in 2010 than in 2011. The coefficient of the year 
2010 is only significant at the 10% level. A more interesting result is found when having 
a relationship with foreign banks is examined. Firms have significantly fewer 
relationships with foreign banks in 2003-2005, but more in 2007 and 2008, just before 
the 2008 global crisis. There can be two explanations for this finding. First, it may be 
explained by the increase in the number of foreign banks in the later period, as Table 4 
shows. Second, firms might switch from state-owned and Islamic banks to foreign banks 
and these switches may be the explanation for the insignificant year effects when total 
number of banking relationship is estimated. 
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In order to investigate whether there is U-shaped relationship between firm 
innovativeness and number of banking relationships, a new model by including the 
squared value of innovativeness, INNOVA2, is estimated, as in von Rheinbaben and 
Ruckes (2004). I also include interaction variables, GSEC1-GSEC8, between firm 
innovativeness and sectors instead of the industry dummy variables to examine whether 
the effect of innovativeness on the number of banking relationship changes by industry. 
Results are shown in the Appendix Table C. Since there is no change in the value or the 
significance level of the coefficients of other variables, only the results related with the 
INNOVA2 and the interaction variables are presented. The coefficient of INNOVA2 is 
not found to be significant, indicating that there is no significant relationship between 
firm innovativeness and the number of banking relationships, regardless of bank types. 
However, for the sector of electricity, gas and water (SEC2), a significant relationship 
between INNOVA and NUMBERB is found. Moreover, the number of relationships 
with state-owned banks decreases with the level of innovativeness for firms operating in 
sectors of electricity, gas and water (SEC2), manufacturing (SEC3) and construction and 
prosperity (SEC4) whereas the number of relationships with private domestic banks 
increases as the level of innovativeness increases for firms operating in sectors of 
electricity, gas and water (SEC2), and manufacturing (SEC3). These findings indicate 
that the relationship between the level of innovativeness and the number of banking 
relationships changes with both bank types and industries. 
 
In conclusion, without making any categorization between banks, I find that profitability 
of a firm and all other firm characteristics, except firm innovativeness and leverage, 
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significantly affect the number of banking relationships. The significant factors affecting 
the number of banking relationships are found to be different according to bank types. It 
is found that there is a negative and significant relationship between firm profitability 
and the number of foreign and private domestic banks. However, no significant 
relationship is found between firm profitability and the number of state-owned and 
participation banks. These results may be explained by the similarities in the lending 
policies of banks. 
 
 
4.3. Relationship between Firm Performance and the Number of Banks 
 
Table 11 reports the estimated coefficients of the firm performance model 
simultaneously estimated with the banking relationship model 2SLS. As it is in the 
previous section, I differentiate banks and analyze relationships of different types of 
banks with firm performances in five models. There are 1663 number of observations in 
each model. The adjusted R
2
sshow that all of these five models explain almost one-
fourth of the variation in firm profitability. F-statistics indicate that the models are 
significant at 1% level. 
 
It is found that the coefficients of all of the banking relationship variables are negative 
and significant at the 1% level, except the coefficient of the number of relationships 
with Islamic banks which is significant only at the 10% level. These findings suggest 
that the more banking relationship a firm has, the lower will be its profitability. This 
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negative link between the number of banking relationships and firm performance is 
consistent with the empirical findings of Degryse and Ongena (2001); Castelli et al. 
(2012);Yu et al. (2007); Montoriol-Garriga (2006). This finding can be explained with 
the theoretical models which argue the negative effect of the costs of having multiple 
banking relationships such as monitoring, screening and borrowing costs, on firm 
performance (Diamond, 1984; Ramakrishna and Thakor, 1984; Boyd and Prescott, 
1986). Furthermore, in contrast to the study of Fok et al. (2004), no difference is 
observed with respect to the effect of maintaining a relationship with foreign or 
domestic banks. That is, profitability of a firm decreases with the number of both 
foreign and domestic banks. Fok et al. (2004) find that firm performance is negatively 
related with the number of domestic banks, but positively related with the number of 
foreign banks in Taiwan, considering the effect of the Asian financial crisis around 
1997. The reason for this conflict might be the effect of the 2008 financial crisis. The 
results with the effect of the 2008 financial crisis presented in part 4.4.2 may shed more 
light to this issue. Another explanation is that there may be no actual or perceived 
difference between the implementations of foreign and domestic banks in the Turkish 
market. 
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The coefficients of all firm characteristics, except AGE, are found to be similar 
regardless of the banking relationship variable used in the model. For example, the 
coefficient of SIZE is positive and significant at the 1% level. This shows that larger 
firms perform significantly better than smaller firms, controlling for their age. The 
coefficient of INNOVA is found to be negatively related to firm performance and its 
coefficient is significant at the 1% level, as it is expected. The coefficient of 
LEVERAGE is found to be negative and significant at the 1% level in all estimations. 
This result is compatible with the theoretical implications of Chang (1992)and empirical 
findings of Fok et al. (2004) and Yu et al. (2007). Chang (1992) argue that in the 
presence of agency conflict between investors and managers, leverage decreases firm 
profitability. Fok et al. (2004) and Yu et al. (2007) find that profitability is significantly 
negatively related to leverage. 
 
LIQUDITY is significantly positively related to firm performance at 1% significance 
level in all models. In the literature, Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2007), and 
Gill, Biger and Mathur (2010) show that with a correct liquidity management strategy, 
firms can create value and increase their profitability levels. Thus, this positive link 
between LIQUDITY and ROA may be arising from conducting a balanced liquidity 
management strategy. It is expected that firms associated with a group which owns a 
bank might get funding with more favorable terms and therefore, be more profitable. 
However, the insignificant relationship between BMEMBER and ROA does not support 
this argument. The insignificant coefficient of AGE suggests that firm performance does 
not change with firm age. 
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With respect to industry fixed effects in the first model, it is found that firms that 
operate in sectors of electricity, gas and water (SEC2), construction and prosperity 
(SEC4), and wholesalers, retailers, hotels and restaurants (SEC7) have significantly 
lower profitability ratios than the firms that operate in the base sector, transportation, 
communication and storage industry. And no significant difference is observed for firms 
operating in other sectors, relative to the base sector. For other models estimated using 
other banking relationship variables, these results hold with few exceptions. For 
example, firms that operate in the manufacturing sector (SEC3) have a significantly 
lower profitability ratio, when the number of relationships with private domestic and 
Islamic banks is controlled. 
 
Lastly, no significant difference in the profitability ratio is found among the years in the 
sample period, controlling for the number of banking relationships and other firm 
characteristics. However, there are some differences when the relationships with 
different bank types are controlled in the model. For example, when the number of 
foreign banking relationships is controlled, the profitability of firms is found to be 
significantly higher in 2007 than in 2011. Similarly, when the number of private 
domestic banking relationship is controlled, the profitability of firms is found to be 
significantly higher in 2003 and 2004 than in 2011. Both coefficients are positive and 
significant at the 5% level. Surprisingly, controlling for the number of Islamic banking 
relationship and other firm characteristics, the profitability of firms in the crisis years 
and in 2005 are significantly lower than profitability in 2011. 
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To sum up, I find a significant and negative relationship between firm performance and 
the number of banks. This negative link is observed for all bank types. All other firm 
characteristics, except AGE and BMEMBER are significantly related to firm 
performance. While firm performance increases in firm size and liquidity, it decreases in 
firm innovativeness and leverage. The insignificant relation between firm performance 
and membership to such a group that owns a bank does not provide any supporting 
evidences for the argument of “related lending”. 
 
 
4.4. Further Estimations 
4.4.1. Cash versus Non-Cash Credit Relationships 
 
In order to investigate whether the relationship between firm performance and the 
number of banks changes with the types of services provided by banks, the credit 
relationships with banks are classified as cash and non-cash relationships. In Table 12, 
Panel A and B present descriptive statistics of the number of cash and non-cash credit 
relationships, respectively.   
 
The mean values of the variable RELATION in Panel A and B indicates that 80% of the 
observations have a relationship with a bank for cash credits, whereas 87% of these have 
a relationship with a bank for non-cash credits. This means that some firms maintain at 
least one banking relationship for non-cash credits even though they do not have any 
cash credit relationship. Similarly, the mean values of the variable MULTIPLE indicates 
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that a larger number of firms have multiple banking relationships for non-cash credits. 
However, on average, firms have more banking relationships for cash credits (3.70) than 
for non-cash credits (3.60) even though there is a greater variation in the total number of 
banking relationships for non-cash credits. 
 
Table 12: Descriptive Statistics of the Number of Cash and  
Non-Cash  Credit Relationships 
 
Panel A: Cash Credit Relationships 
Variables N Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. Minimum Maximum 
B
a
n
k
in
g
 R
el
a
ti
o
n
sh
ip
 
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s 
RELATION 1663 0.80 1 0.40 0 1 
MULTIPLE 1331 0.82 0 0.38 0 1 
NUMBERB 1663 3.70 3 3.55 0 17 
NUMBERP 1663 2.24 2 2.13 0 12 
NUMBERF 1663 0.70 0 1.14 0 7 
NUMBERS 1663 0.67 0 1.00 0 4 
NUMBERI 1663 0.06 0 0.37 0 4 
NUMBERT 1663 0.02 0 0.14 0 2 
Panel B: Non-Cash Credit Relationships 
B
a
n
k
in
g
 R
el
a
ti
o
n
sh
ip
 
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s 
RELATION 1663 0.87 1 0.33 0 1 
MULTIPLE 1454 0.82 0 0.38 0 1 
NUMBERB 1663 3.60 3 3.26 0 23 
NUMBERP 1663 2.37 2 2.01 0 15 
NUMBERF 1663 0.64 0 1.10 0 9 
NUMBERS 1663 0.41 0 0.72 0 4 
NUMBERI 1663 0.10 0 0.40 0 4 
NUMBERT 1663 0.08 0 0.28 0 2 
 
 
Firms have a maximum of 23 number of banking relationships for non-cash credits 
while 17 number of banking relationships for cash credits. When banks are categorized 
according to their nationality, ownership structure and orientation, the order of 
preference does not change for credit types, comparing to the order that Table 3 presents 
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for all credit relationships. The most preferable bank types are the private domestic 
banks with the median number of 2.24 for cash-credits and 2.37 for non-cash credits.  
 
Table 13 presents the results of the banking relationship equations. Panel A shows the 
results for the cash credit relationships and Panel B shows the estimation of a non-cash 
credit relationship. F-statistics of all models are significant at the 1% level. The adjusted 
R
2
s in Panel A are higher than the ones in Panel B, indicating that the model explains 
the variability in the number of cash relationships more than the variability in a non-cash 
relationship. 
 
The variables SIZE, LEVERAGE, BMEMBER and INCENT are found to affect both 
the total number of cash and non-cash credit relationships in a similar way. It is also 
found that an increase in profitability reduces the number of both cash and non-cash 
credit relationships significantly. However, the variables NONFIN, GROUP and MNC 
are found to be significantly and negatively associated with only the number of cash 
credit relationships whereas AGE and STATE are significant and positive only for the 
number of non-cash credit relationships. Furthermore, the coefficient of firm 
innovativeness is found to be significant in only the cash credit relationship estimation 
model. Significant and positive relationship between firm innovativeness and the 
number of cash credits is compatible with the general expectation that when a firm is 
growing and has more R&D expenditures, then it has generally have more number of 
cash credit relationships but not non-cash credit relationships. 
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When the number of banking relationships is measured with respect to different bank 
types, I find that the differences and similarities between the determinants of credit types 
vary. For example, an increase in profitability of a firm decreases the number of cash 
credit relationships with private banks and the number of non-cash credits with both 
private domestic and foreign banks. However, firm profitability does not affect the 
number of relationships with other banks. The negative relationship between firm 
profitability and the number of relationship with foreign banks for non-cash credits may 
be driven by the commercial letter of credits obtained from foreign countries. Exporters 
in foreign countries generally request commercial letter of credits obtained from 
international banks in order protect themselves against the financial risk of the importers 
in host countries. Moreover, if an exporter in a foreign country believes that profitability 
of the importer is low and importer has difficulty in repayment, it might request 
commercial letter of credits obtained from banks established in their countries. 
Therefore, the negative relationship between firm performance and the number of 
relationships with foreign banks for non-cash credits might be explained by the 
commercial letter of credits obtained from foreign banks.  
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Multinational firms are found to be negatively related to the number of only private 
domestic banks for both credit types. Although the numbers of cash credit relationships 
with state-owned, private domestic and participation banks are significantly lower for 
firms belonging to a group or a holding, these firms have a significantly higher number 
of relationships with foreign banks for non-cash credits, but not for cash credits. 
Moreover, the number of cash credit relationship significantly decreases with an 
increase in obtaining funding from external sources other than bank loans, for all bank 
types. As expected, this variable does not have any significant effect on the number of 
non-cash credits for all bank types. 
 
These findings are slightly different from the previous evidences in the literature. 
Ongena and Smith (2000b) also examine different banking services, such as liquidity, 
lending, cash management or investment related services, in their cross-country study 
but do not report any difference between lending and non-lending relationships. Unlike 
them, this study suggests that the factors affecting the cash and non-cash credit 
relationships are slightly different for Turkish firms. Therefore, if a study from other 
countries combines various banking services under one title to examine the determinants 
of the number of banking relationships, it can be suitable to check whether findings still 
hold for different types of banking services. Different results may be obtained if various 
banking services are combined and the number of banking relationships is examined. 
 
Second, I re-estimate firm performance equations to investigate possible changes in the 
relationship between firm performance and the number of cash and non-cash credits. 
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Results are presented in Table 14.Panels A and B show results from the estimation of 
cash credits and non-cash credits, respectively. All F-statistics are significant at the 1% 
level. Without categorizing banks, I find that there is not any change in the negative link 
between firm performance and the number of cash and non-cash credits. Firm 
performance decreases as the number of banking relationships increases regardless of 
having cash or non-cash relationships. 
 
When the banking relationship variables are measured according to different bank types, 
I find that the association between firm performance and non-cash credit relationship 
disappears for only Islamic banks. For other types of banks, there is still a negative 
relationship between firm performance and the number of both cash and non-cash 
credits. However, coefficients of the non-cash credit relationships are less significant 
than the ones of the cash credit relationships, even though the estimated coefficients are 
similar. This indicates that even if firm performance decreases in number of non-cash 
credits relationships, their significance are less than ones in case of cash credit 
relationships. 
 
Other firm characteristics are found to affect profitability in similar ways, when the 
numbers of cash and non-cash credit relationships are included in the model. 
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4.4.2. Effects of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis 
 
In order to investigate whether the 2008 global financial crisis affected the relationship 
between profitability and the number of banking relationships, I divide the whole 
sample period into two sub-periods. The global crisis is assumed to affect the Turkish 
economic and financial systems in 2008 and 2009, following the studies by Claessens et 
al. (2010), and Alp and Elekdağ (2011). Based on this assumption, I create the dummy 
variable, CRISIS, which equals to one for the crisis years 2008 and 2009, and zero for 
all the other years in the sample period. Furthermore, I do not control year effect, since 
banking relationship models are estimated by the dummy variable CRISIS and no 
significant differences is found among years. Results from this estimation are presented 
in Table 15. Although the number of observations is smaller in crisis times, the adjusted 
R
2
s are higher than the one for the non-crisis periods, except the estimation for the 
number of relationships with state-owned banks. 
 
When the model for the total number of banking relationships is examined, firm size, 
obtaining funding from external sources other than bank loans, and incentives from the 
government are found to be significantly related to the total number of banking 
relationships in both crisis and non-crisis periods.  AGE, LEVERAGE and BMEMBER 
are found to be significantly related to the number of banks only during the crisis period 
whereas the variables ROA, GROUP and STATE are significantly related to the number 
of banking relationships in non-crisis period. 
 
95 
 
Without separating sample period, no significant relationship is found between 
belonging to a group that owns a bank and the total number of banking relationships. 
However, when sample period is divided as crisis and non-crisis years, it is found a 
significant and negative relationship between belonging to a group that owns a bank and 
the total number of banking relationships in only crisis years. This might indicate that 
since a firm belonging to a group that owns a bank can more easily find funding from 
that bank rather than other banks in crisis years, the number of banking relationships 
decreases for this firm in crisis years. This finding may be interpreted as an evidence for 
the argument of “related lending” in crisis years in Turkey. 
 
When the number of banking relationships by bank types is examined, I find that with a 
few exceptions, firm characteristics generally lose their significance in crisis periods, 
but the characteristics that lose significance vary across bank types. Firm profitability is 
found to be negatively related only to the number of private domestic banks in non-crisis 
years. There is no significant relationship between firm profitability and the number of 
relationships with other bank types. These results indicate that the negative relationship 
between firm performance and the total number of banks in non-crisis years is driven by 
just the negative relationship between firm profitability and the number of private 
domestic banks. 
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While firm age is not related to the number of foreign and Islamic banks during the non-
crisis times, it is found to be significantly related to the number of these banks during 
the crisis times but in opposite directions. Older firms have significantly more number 
of relationships with foreign banks whereas younger firms have significantly more 
number of relationships with Islamic banks during the crisis periods. On the other hand, 
the reverse relationship is observed with state-owned banks. Firm age is found to be 
negatively and significantly related to the number of state-owned banks during the non-
crisis times whereas it is not during the crisis times. Moreover, the number of private 
domestic banks increases in firm age for both sub-periods.  
 
Interestingly, in contrast to the expectation, the number of relationships with state-
owned banks increases significantly with firm leverage in both sub-periods. However, 
there is no such relationship with other bank types. This result indicates that Turkish 
firms with higher leverage ratios maintain more relationships with state-owned banks, 
but not with other bank types, in the both periods. This finding might be explained with 
the differences in management policies of different banks. State-owned banks may 
continue to provide credits but other banks might reduce their relationship during crisis 
years. These results show that the 2008 financial crisis creates differences in the 
determinants of the number of banking relationships, and these differences also vary 
across different bank types. 
 
I re-investigate the firm performance equations in order to examine whether there is any 
difference in the relationship between firm performance and the number of banks in 
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times of crisis. Results are presented in Table 16.Although the number of observations is 
smaller in the crisis period, the adjusted R
2
s are higher. This indicates that the model 
explains the variability in firm profitability in the crisis period more than in the non-
crisis period. Table 16 shows that the significant negative relationship between firm 
performance and the number of banking relationships disappears in the time of the 2008 
global crisis. This finding is observed for all bank types, except Islamic banks. The 
relationship between firm performance and the number of relationships with Islamic 
banks is not found to be significant in neither crisis nor non-crisis periods. These results 
indicate that in the time of the 2008 global financial crisis, performances of Turkish 
firms does not significantly change with the number of banking relationships, but with 
other variables such as firm size or leverage. This result may be explained by the 
switches occurred from private banks to foreign and state-owned banks during the crisis 
years. By switching from private banks to foreign and state-owned banks during crisis 
years, firms might prevent the negative effect of having relationships with private banks 
on firm performance which is found as an empirical result only in non-crisis years. In 
this context, Turkish firms differ from Taiwanese firms. Distinguishing domestic and 
foreign banking relationships, Fok et al. (2004) find that performances of Taiwanese 
firms are negatively related with the number of domestic banking relationships only in 
times of the Asian financial crisis, but positively related with the number of foreign 
banking relationships in pre- and post-crisis periods. 
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The other factors, firm size, leverage and liquidity, are found to be significantly related 
to the performance of a firm in both crisis and non-crisis periods, regardless of the 
number of banking relationship controlled in the model. 
 
 
4.4.3. Size Effect 
 
In the literature, many theoretical models that explain the optimum number of banking 
relationships are valid for small-sized firms rather than large-sized firms mainly for two 
reasons. First, since raising funds by issuing stocks or bonds is too costly and more 
difficult for small- and medium-sized firms, these firms rely more on bank loans than 
large-sized firms. Second, small-sized firms generally consist of newly established or 
young firms which do not have enough credit history. Thus, these firms are more likely 
to suffer from asymmetric information problems which can be solved through close 
banking relationships. The first reasoning is not valid for our sample since all firms in 
the sample are listed in the BIST. In addition to theoretical predictions, many empirical 
studies also find that the relationship between firms and banks differ according to firm 
size in various countries. I also find that there is a positive and significant relationship 
between the number of banking relationships and size of a firm. As size increases, the 
number of banking relationships increases controlling for other firm characteristics. This 
is also observed in other countries. For instance, Cesarini (1994) find that small-sized 
firms maintain on average two number of banking relationships, whereas large-sized 
firms maintain on average 33 number of banking relationships in Italy. In order to 
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examine whether results change by firm size in Turkey, I divide the whole sample into 
two, as small- and large-sized ones using the dummy variable, DSIZE, for every year. 
The dummy variable DSIZE equals to one if firm size is larger than the median size 
value measured with market value, and to zero, otherwise. 
 
Table 17: The Mean Values of the Banking Relationship Variables  
for Small- and Large-Sized Firms 
 
DSIZE NUMBERB NUMBERS NUMBERF NUMBERP NUMBERI N 
0 4.98 0.73 0.93 3.10 0.14 830 
1 6.23 1.03 1.28 3.68 0.12 833 
DSIZE=1: firms whose size is greater than the median of size value, DSIZE=0: otherwise 
 
 
Table 17 shows how the mean values of the numbers of banking relationships change 
for different firm sizes. Results indicate that on average, larger firms maintain more 
banking relationships for all bank types, except Islamic banks. 
 
Table 18 presents the estimation results of the banking relationship models for small- 
and large-sized firms. For the total number of banking relationships, the significant 
factors in determining the number of banking relationships, except SIZE, are found to be 
totally different for small- and large-sized firms. Interestingly, the negative association 
between firm profitability and the number of banks becomes insignificant for both types 
of firms. As size of a firm increases, the total number of banking relationships also 
increases significantly for both small- and large-sized firms. Age of a firms and 
obtaining funding from external sources other than bank loans are found to be 
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significantly related to the total number of banking relationships for only smaller firms. 
The variables, INNOVA, LEVERAGE, BMEMBER, INCENT and STATE, are found 
to be significantly related to the total number of banking relationships, for only large-
sized firms. 
 
Although GROUP is found to be significantly related to the number of banking 
relationships for both small- and large-sized companies, the signs of the coefficients of 
GROUP are surprisingly opposite of each other: if a firm is small and belongs to a 
group, then it has a lower number of banking relationships whereas if a firm is large and 
belongs to a group or a holding, then it has higher number of banking relationships. 
However, the negative relationship between the number of banks and belonging to a 
group that owns a bank is found for large-sized firms. This finding indicates that large-
sized firms obtain funding from their group banks rather than other banks and other 
firms in the group. 
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After categorizing the number of banking relationships by bank types, it is found that 
the significant factors explaining the number of banking relationships of small and large 
firms change according to bank types. LEVERAGE, NONFIN, INCENT and STATE 
are found to be the significant factors affecting the number of state-owned banks 
regardless the size of the firms. On the other hand, small-sized firms that belong to a 
group have lower number of relationships with state-owned banks whereas these small-
sized firms belonging to a group that owns a bank have higher number of relationships 
with state-owned banks. The determinants of the number of relationships with foreign, 
private domestic and Islamic banks are found to be generally different for small and 
large firms. The coefficient of GROUP variable is found to the interesting. Results 
indicate that the number of relationships with foreign and private domestic banks is 
significantly lower for small-sized firms belonging to a group or a holding but the 
number of relationships with foreign and private domestic banks is significantly higher 
for large-sized firms belonging to a group or a holding. Similar contradicting results are 
found in the relationships between firm leverage and the number of relationships with 
foreign and private domestic banks for small- and large-sized firms. Although it is found 
that as leverage ratio of a large-sized firm increases, the numbers of relationships with 
private domestic and foreign banks also increase significantly, the relationships between 
firm leverage and the number of relationships with foreign and private domestic banks 
for small-sized firms is not significant. These findings support the theoretical 
implications that the factors affecting the number of banking relationships can be 
different for firms with different sizes. 
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The negative and significant relationship between firm profitability and the number of 
relationships with foreign and private domestic banks presented in Table 10 become 
insignificant when firms are categorized by firm size. However, in general, the 
coefficient of firm profitability is found to be negative for both small and large-sized 
firms. 
 
When the estimations of firm performance are examined (Table 19), all coefficients of 
the banking relationship variables are found to be negative and significant in explaining 
firm profitability for small-sized firms, but not for the large-sized firms. It suggests that 
the negative relationships between firm profitability and the number of different bank 
types presented in Table 11 are driven by only small-sized firms. This finding is 
compatible with the results of many theoretical models that argue the differences in the 
financial structures of small- and large-sized firms. Comparing large-sized firms, small-
sized firms obtain funding by mainly using bank loans and thereby banking relationship 
variables are found to be significantly affecting firm profitability for only small-sized 
firms. 
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Table 19 also shows that firm age, innovativeness and state-ownership are not 
significant factors affecting firm profitability for any types of firms. However, firm size 
are found to be positively and significantly related to firm profitability regardless of the 
size of a firm. It is fount that firm profitability increases as size of a firm increases for 
both types of firms. On the other hand, firm leverage is found to be a significant factor 
affecting firm profitability for both firm types. This indicates that as leverage of a firm 
increases, firm profitability decreases significantly for both types of firms. Liquidity of a 
firm affects only large-sized firms’ profitability. Similar results are found when the 
numbers of relationships with other bank types are included in the model. 
 
 
4.4.4. Robustness Check with Basic Earning Power Ratio 
 
As a robustness check, banking relationships and firm performance models are re-
estimated by defining firm performance with BEP ratio instead of ROA. I analyze 
whether main results related to the relationship between firm performance and the 
number of banks are driven by the proxy used to measure firm performance or by the 
inner relationship between firm performance and the number of banks. Table 20 
presents the results. In Panel A, the results from the banking relationship estimation are 
shown. Both F-statistics and the adjusted R
2
s are found to be less than the ones 
presented in Table 20. This means that the explanatory power of the banking 
relationship model declines when BEP Ratio is used instead of ROA as a measure of 
firm performance. It is found that the coefficients of the all firm characteristics, except 
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STATE, presented in Table 20 are consistent with the ones presented in Table 3. This 
result holds even after categorizing the number of banking relationships by bank types. 
These findings indicates that firm profitability is found to be a significant factor 
affecting the number of relationships with foreign banks, and relationships decrease not 
because of the proxy used to measure firm profitability, but because of the inherent 
relationship between firm performance and the number of banks. 
 
Panel B shows the results from the firm performance estimation. There is not any major 
difference in the F-statistics and the adjusted R
2
s presented in Table 11 and in Table 20. 
It indicates that the explanatory power of the firm performance model does not change 
when firm profitability is measured with BEP ratio, instead of ROA. It is found that the 
negative relationship between firm performance and the number of banking 
relationships still holds when firm performance is measured with BEP ratio. This result 
is valid for all bank types, except Islamic banks. The number of relationships with 
Islamic banks is not found to be significantly related to the firm performance, when BEP 
ratio used as a proxy. These results provide supporting evidences for the findings 
presented in Table 11. Apart from this, the coefficients of other firm characteristics, 
SIZE, INNOVA, LEVERAGE and LIQUIDITY are found to be significantly related to 
firm performances, regardless of the banking relationship variables used in the 
estimation. This finding is also consistent with the previous findings presented in Table 
11. 
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These results from the robustness check estimations are consistent with the main 
findings found in the earlier estimations of the banking relationship and firm 
performance models.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
In this thesis, I examine the relationship between firm performance and the number of 
banking relationships. Banking relationship is defined as having both short- and long-
term credit relationships. Firm performance is measured with firm profitability, proxied 
with ROA and BEP ratio. In the analysis, banks are classified into four groups according 
to their nationality, ownership structure and orientations. Banking relationships are also 
categorized as cash and non-cash credit relationships. The possible impacts of the 2008 
global crisis and size effect are also investigated. 
 
Descriptive statistics shows that approximately %90 of the sample have at least one 
banking relationship and Turkish firms maintain on average 5.60 number of banking 
relationships over the sample period 2003-2011. It is also found that on average, Turkish 
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firms first prefer to have a relationship with private domestic banks, and then with 
foreign, state-owned and Islamic banks. 
 
The results of the probit model show that the factors of firm size, leverage ratio and 
obtaining incentives from the government increase the probabilities of having a banking 
relationship and maintaining multiple banking relationships. However, obtaining 
funding from external sources other than bank loans or belonging to a group mitigate 
these two probabilities. Although age of a firm and being a multinational company 
significantly affect only the probability of having a banking relationship, belonging to a 
group that owns a bank significantly affects only the probabilities of having multiple 
banking relationships. However, firm profitability and innovativeness are not found to 
significantly affect these two probabilities. In general, these results are consistent with 
my a priori expectations, except the positive effect of obtaining incentives from the 
government on the probabilities of having any banking relationship and maintaining 
multiple banking relationships. 
 
Generally, the findings of the probit model for Turkey are consistent with the results 
from other countries. For example, the insignificant relationship between firm age and 
the probability of having multiple banking relationships for Turkish firms is similar to 
the findings of Detragiache et al. (2000) and Tirri (2007) for Italian firms. The negative 
effect of obtaining funding from external sources except bank loans on the probability of 
having multiple banking relationships is compatible with the results of Sterken and 
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Tokutsu (2002) for Japan, but not with the results of Cosci and Meliciani (2002) for 
Italy. 
 
These results should be interpreted with caution, because having any banking 
relationship or a multiple banking relationships might be driven not only by the 
preferences of firms but it might be the choices of banks. In the literature, many studies 
explain the choice of having any banking relationship as a decision of a firm considering 
the effect of different factors, such as holdup costs or the effect of exogenous liquidity 
shocks in the banking sectors credits. However, in Turkey, the requirements of BRSA 
about the banking law No.5411(Section 3, Article 54) and the policies applied by 
several banks force firm to have multiple banking relationships. According to this law, 
banks are not allowed to provide loans more than 25% of their shareholders’ equity. 
Moreover, a manager of one Turkish bank stated that although the amount of credit 
demanded by firms are below the limits, banks do not want to take the total risk by 
themselves and prefer to share the credit risk with other banks, especially after the 2001 
Turkish banking crisis. For this reason, in order to obtain funding for the unsatisfied part 
of the required credit amount, Turkish firms might borrow credits from other banks. 
 
In the second part of the analysis, the factors affecting the number of banking 
relationships are examined. Banking relationship equations are simultaneously estimated 
with the firm performance equations by using 2SLS. Without categorizing banks, firm 
profitability and other firm characteristics, except firm innovativeness and leverage, are 
found to be significant factors affecting the total number of banking relationships. 
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Results indicate that as profitability of a firm increases, the total number of banking 
relationships decreases, as reported by the studies of Ziane (2003), and Harhoff and 
Körting (1998a). Moreover, the positive coefficients of firm age and size in the model 
are consistent with the findings of Detragiache et al. (2000), Cosci and Meliciani (2002), 
Degryse et al. (2004), and Harhoff and Körting (1998a). 
 
When banking relationships are classified by bank types, it is found that factors 
affecting the number of banking relationship change according to bank types. Results 
show that the negative relationship between profitability of a firm and the number of 
banking relationships is driven only by the negative relationship between firm 
profitability and the number of relationship with foreign and private domestic banks. 
This finding might be explained by the similarities in the credit offering policies of 
foreign and private banks. It can also be argue that state-owned and Islamic banks might 
follow other similar policies in credit offerings that do not create any significant 
relationship between firm profitability and the number of relationship with these banks. 
In addition to this, as firms obtain funding from other external sources rather than bank 
loans, only the number of relationships with private domestic banks decreases 
significantly. No significant relationship is observed between the factor of obtaining 
funding from other sources and the number of relationships with other bank types. 
Furthermore, it is found that the factor of belonging to a group that owns a bank is 
negatively and significantly related to the number of relationships with foreign and 
private domestic banks but positively and significantly to the number of relationships 
with state-owned banks. 
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Results from the firm performance equation show that there is a negative and significant 
relationship between firm performance and the number of banks, regardless of bank 
types. This means that more profitable firms maintain fewer banking relationships, 
controlling for debt ratio and other firm characteristics. This finding suggests that the 
theoretical implications that argue the negative effects of having multiple banking 
relationships on firm performances (Diamond, 1984, Ramakrishna and Thakor, 1984, 
Boyd and Prescott, 1986, Yosha, 1995, and Bhattacharya and Chiesa, 1995) are also 
valid for Turkish firms. This finding is also consistent with the empirical findings of 
other countries, Norway, Italy, Taiwan and Spain (Degryse and Ongena, 2001, Castelli 
et al., 2012, Yu and Hsieh, 2003, and Montoriol-Garriga, 2006). 
 
When the types of lending relationships are examined, it is found that some factors 
affecting the number of banking relationships change for cash and non-cash credits. For 
example, firm age and state-ownership are found to be significantly related to the total 
number of banks for only non-cash credit relationships. However, firm innovativeness, 
obtaining funding from external sources other than bank loans, belonging to a group or a 
holding and being a multinational company are found to be significant factors affecting 
the total number of cash credit relationships. On the other hand, the negative 
relationship between firm profitability and the total number of banks holds for both cash 
and non-cash credits. For example, firm profitability is found to negatively affect the 
number of cash credit relationships with only private domestic banks and the number of 
non-cash credit relationship with both private domestic and foreign banks. Although, 
Ongena and Smith (2000b) do not find any difference between the results of credit and 
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non-credit relationships, the findings from Turkish firms show that there are some 
differences in the determinants of banking relationships for different types of credit 
relationships in Turkey. Therefore, combining different banking services may not be 
appropriate while investigating the determinants of banking relationships. On the other 
hand, firm performances are found to decrease with the number of both cash and non-
cash relationship with all bank types, except Islamic banks. 
 
On average, Turkish firms are fount to maintain significantly more number of 
relationships with state-owned and foreign banks, but smaller number of relationships 
with private domestic banks in crisis years, compared to non-crisis years. These findings 
might be explained by the possible switches from private domestic banks to foreign and 
state-owned banks in crisis years. These switches might occur since Turkish firms might 
think that foreign and state-owned banks will not fail during crisis years. In addition, 
private domestic banks might also force Turkish firms to switch to foreign and state-
owned banks by not lending credits during the crisis years. These results are not 
consistent with the findings of Fok et al. (2004). They find that Taiwanese firms 
establish new banking relationships with domestic banks and end current relationships 
with foreign banks during the Asian financial crisis. Thus, the behavior of firms might 
be different in different countries or might change with the characteristics of crisis. 
 
In the banking relationship model, a negative and significant relationship between firm 
performance and the total number of banks is observed for only non-crisis years and this 
negative relationship can be explained with the negative relationship between firm 
117 
 
profitability and the number of relationships with private domestic banks. Interestingly, 
it is found that as debt ratio of Turkish firms’ increases, the number of relationships with 
state-owned banks increases in crisis periods. This finding can be explained by either the 
firms’ choices or by the policies adopted by banks in crisis years. Firms with a high 
leverage ratio might prefer to have a relationship with state-owned banks in crisis times, 
since they believed that these banks are less fragile to the effects of the global financial 
crisis compared to the foreign and private domestic banks. State-owned banks might 
offer more favorable credit terms with the support of the government during the crisis 
period. 
 
Infirm performance model, the negative coefficient of the number of banking 
relationships is found to be significant for only non-crisis years, and for all bank types, 
except Islamic banks. The number of banking relationships seems to affect Turkish 
firms’ profitability in a different way than Taiwanese firms since Fok et al. (2004) find 
that performances of Taiwanese firms are negatively related with the number of 
domestic banking relationships only in times of the Asian financial crisis, but positively 
related with the number of foreign banking relationships in pre- and post-crisis periods. 
 
The factors affecting the number of banking relationships are found to be different for 
small- and large-sized firms. It is observed that on average, larger firms have larger 
number of relationships with all types of banks, except Islamic banks, compared to 
small-sized firms. This finding supports the theoretical implication that small-sized 
firms maintain few but close banking relationships since they are more likely to suffer 
118 
 
from the asymmetric information problem, compared to large-sized firms. It is also 
consistent with the empirical evidences from various countries. The factors of firm age 
and obtaining funds from external sources except bank loans are found to be 
significantly related to the total number of banking relationships for just small-sized 
firms. The total number of banking relationships is significantly affected from firm 
innovativeness, leverage, related lending, obtaining incentives from the government and 
state-ownership for only large-sized firms. Firms belonging to a group or a holding are 
found to be significantly related to the number of banking relationships regardless of 
their size. However, the signs of the coefficients are surprisingly found to be opposite 
for small- and large-sized firms. The total number of banking relationships is lower for 
small-sized firms belonging to a group or a holding, whereas it is higher for large-sized 
firms belonging to a group or a holding. When banking relationships are classified by 
bank types, it is found that the differences in the factors affecting the number of banking 
relationships for small- and large-sized firms also vary across bank types. 
 
Firm profitability is found to decrease with the number of banking relationships for only 
small-sized firms. Furthermore, this relationship is observed for all bank types, except 
Islamic banks. This finding is compatible with the theoretical models that argue the 
validity of the banking relationships theories for small-sized firms rather than larger-
sized ones. These studies suggest that small-sized firms are more likely to suffer from 
informational asymmetry problems since they generally consist of newly establishes or 
young firms which do not have enough credit history. 
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5.1. Limitation and Further Research Areas 
 
In this study, the number of banking relationships is determined at the end of the year 
because of the availability of data. Unfortunately, any banking relationship that a firm 
might have during a year but terminate before the end of the year is not included in the 
analysis. The unavailability of data during the year might result in the underestimation 
of the number of banking relationships that a firm might have. This limitation can be 
solved by using semi-annual or quarterly data in the analysis, if data become available. 
 
In the analysis, how the relationship between the number of banks and firm performance 
changes during the crisis periods. Two years, 2008 and 2009, are taken as crisis years. 
However, Claessens et al. (2010) indicate that Turkey was affected from the 2008 global 
financial crisis in the second quarter of the year 2008 and Alp and Elekdağ (2011) 
indicate that the negative effect of the 2008 global financial crisis on the Turkish 
economic and financial sectors was observed until the third quarter of 2009. The crisis 
period might be defined on a quarterly basis if data become available. 
 
The sample used in the analysis consists of firms that are listed in the BIST. These firms 
do not only depend on banks for funding but can more easily raise equity compared to 
other small and middle-sized firms that are not publicly traded. Hence, the number of 
banking relationships might be lower for these public firms. Moreover, in the literature, 
many theoretical models that analyze the optimum number of banking relationships 
discuss validity of their findings especially for small-sized firms rather than the large-
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sized ones. Therefore, when the data become available, the models can be tested for 
small- and medium-sized firms that are not publicly traded since we observe same 
difference for the small- and large-sized publicly traded firms in the BIST. 
 
In the literature, many studies analyze the impact of the banking relationship on firm 
performance focusing on other characteristics of banking relationship such as duration 
and scope as well as characteristics of loans borrowed such as cost of credits, collateral 
requirements, or loan maturity. Due to the data constraints, in this thesis I can only 
analyze the relationship between the number of banks and firm profitability. If data 
become available, it would be interesting to examine the relationship between firm 
performance and these other characteristics of banking relationship and loan 
characteristics. 
 
A positive relationship between the number of banks and the incentives obtained from 
the government is observed. This result might be observed, if these incentives are 
transferred to the firms through investment and development banks. I argue that positive 
relationship between obtaining incentives from the government and the number of 
relationships with state-owned and private domestic banks may be driven by the 
categorization of the development and investment banks. Over the sample period, except 
2003, there were thirteen investment and development banks. This provides enough 
number of observations for a further research in which investment and development 
banks can also be separately categorized and models can be test for this type of banks. 
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In the analysis, I find that with few differences, the factors affecting the number of 
relationships with foreign and private domestic banks are almost the same, whereas the 
factors affecting the number of relationships with state-owned and Islamic banks are 
similar to each other. This finding suggests that these banks might have different 
policies in granting credits as Aydoğan and Booth (1996) indicate. They report that in 
Turkey, compared to private banks, state-owned banks exhibited lower interest margins 
and longer maturities, which might be consequences of differences in portfolio 
constraints and the management style of these banks. In this context, further studies are 
needed to investigate the reasons behind the similarities in the findings for different 
bank groups. 
122 
 
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
 
 
 
Aydoğan, K., and G.G. Booth. 1996. “Performance Characteristics of Private and State-
Owned Banks. The Turkish Case". Managerial Finance 22(10), 18-39. 
 
Alp H., and S. Elekdağ. 2011. "The Role of Monetary Policy in Turkey during the 
Global Financial Crisis," IMF Working PapersNo.11. 
 
Akerlof, G.A., P. Romer, R.E. Hall, and N. Gregory. 1993. “Looting: The Economic 
Underworld of Bankruptcy for Profit.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 
Microeconomics 2, 1–73. 
 
Aoki, M., H. Patrick, and P. Sheard. 1994. “The Japanese Main Bank System: An 
Introductory Overview.” The Japanese Main Bank System, Its Relevance for 
Developing and Transforming Economies. Oxford University Press. Oxford. 
 
Berger, A.N., L.F. Klapper, M.S. Martinez Peria, and R. Zaida. 2008. “Bank Ownership 
Type and Banking Relationships” Journal of Financial Intermediation 17, 37-62. 
 
Bhattacharya, S., and G. Chiesa. 1995. “Proprietary Information, Financial 
Intermediation and Research Incentives.” Journal of financial Intermediation 4, 
328-257. 
 
Bolton, P., and D.S. Scharfstein. 1996. “Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of 
Creditors.” Journal of Political Economy 104, 1-25. 
 
Boot, A.W.A. 2000. “Relationship Banking: What Do We Know?” Journal of Financial 
Intermediation 9 (1), 7-25. 
 
Boyd, J.H., and E.C. Prescott. 1986. “Financial Intermediary Coalitions.” Journal of 
Economic Theory 38 (2), 211-232. 
 
123 
 
Bris, A., and I. Welch. 2005. “The Optimal Concentration of Creditors.” Journal of 
Finance 60, 2193-2212. 
 
Cakova, U. 2011. “Capital Structure Determinants of Turkish SMEs in Manufacturing 
Industry.” Unpublished master’s thesis. İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University. 
Ankara 
 
Castelli, A., G.P. Dwyer, and I. Hasan. 2012. “Bank Relationships and Small Firms’ 
Financial Performance: The Italian Experience.” European Financial 
Management 18, 28-69 
 
Cesarini, F. 1994. “The Relationship between Banks and Firms in Italy: A Banker’s 
View.” Review of Economic Conditions in Italy, 29-50. 
 
Chang, C. 1992. “Capital Structure as an Optimal Contract Between Employees and 
Investors.” The Journal of Finance 47 (3), 1141-1158. 
 
Claessens, S., G. Dell’Ariccia, D. Igan, and L. Leaven. 2010. “Cross-Country 
Experiences and Policy Implications from the Global Financial Crisis.” Economic 
Policy. 62, 267-293. 
 
Cosci, S., and V. Meliciani. 2002. “Multiple Banking: Evidence from the Italian 
Experience.” The Manchester School 70, 37-54. 
 
Cosci, S., and V. Meliciani. 2006. “Multiple Banking Relationships and Over-Leverage 
in Italian Manufacturing Firms.” The Manchester School 74, 78-92. 
 
D’Auria, C., A. Foglia, and P.M. Reedtz. 1999. “Bank Monitoring and the Pricing of 
Corporate Public Debt.” Journal of Financial Economics 51, 435-449. 
 
Degryse. H., M. Kim, and S. Ongena. 2009. Microeconometrics of Banking: Methods, 
Applications and Results. Oxford University Press. Oxford. 
 
Degryse, H., N. Masschelein, and J. Mitchell. 2004. “Belgium SMEs and Bank Lending 
Relationship.” Financial Stability Review 3, 121-134. 
 
Degryse, H., and S. Ongena. 2001. ”Bank Relationships and Firm Profitability.” 
Financial Management 30, 9-34. 
 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A., and V. Maksimoviç. 1998. ''Law, Finance, and Firm Growth.”' 
Journal of Finance 53 (6), 2107-2137. 
 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A. and R. Levine. 1999. “Bank-Based and Market Based Financial 
Systems: Cross-Country Comparisons.” World Bank Policy Working Paper No. 
2143. Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=569255 
124 
 
Detragiache, E., P.G. Garella, and L. Guiso. 2000. “Multiple versus Single Banking 
Relationships.” Journal of Finance 3, 1133-1161. 
 
Dewatripont, M., and E. Maskin. 1995. “Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and 
Decentralized Economies.” Review of Economic Studies 62, 541-555. 
 
Diamond, D.W. 1984. “Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring.” Review of 
Economic Studies 51 (3), 393-414. 
 
Dietsch, M., and V. Golitin-Boubakari. 2002. “La Consolidation du Systeme Bancaire et 
le Financement des PME en France.” Working Paper. Available at: 
http://www.economia.uniroma2.it/ceis/conferenze_convegni/banking2002/papers/
4dic/Dietsch-Golitin.pdf.  
 
Eljelly, A.M.A. 2004. “Liquidity-Profitability Tradeoff: An Empirical Investigation in 
an Emerging Market.” International Journal of Commerce and Management 14 
(2), 48-61. 
 
Elsas, R., F. Heinemann, and M. Tyrell. 2004. “Multiple but Asymmetric Bank 
Financing: The Case of Relationship Lending.” CESifo Working Papers. No.1251. 
 
Elsas, R., and J.P. Krahnen. 1998. “Is Relationship Lending Special? Evidence from 
Credit-File Data in Germany.” Journal of Banking and Finance 22, 1283-1316. 
 
Fama, E.F. 1985. “What’s Different about Banks?” Journal of Monetary Economics 15 
(1), 29-39. 
 
Farinha, L.A., and J.A.C. Santos. 2006. “The Survival of Start-ups: Do Their Funding 
Choices and Bank Relationships at Birth Matter?” Working Paper. Available at: 
http://www.eu-financial-
system.org/fileadmin/content/Dokumente_Events/seventh_conferance/Farinha.pdf 
 
Fisher, K. 1990. “Hausbankbeziehungen als Intrument der Bindung zwischen Banken 
und Unternehmen–Eine Theoretische und Empirische Analyse.” Unpublished 
Ph.D. Dissertation. University Bonn. 
 
Foglia, Q., S. Laviola, and P.M. Reedtz. 1998. “Multiple Banking Relationships and the 
Fragility of Corporate Borrowers.” Journal of Banking and Finance 22, 1441-
1456. 
 
Fok, R.C.W., Y.C. Chang, and W.T. Lee. 2004. “Bank Relationships and Their Effects 
on Firm Performance around Asian Financial Crises: Evidence from Taiwan.” 
Financial Management 33, 89-112 
125 
 
Garcia-Teruel, P.J., and P.M. Martinez-Solano. 2007. “Effects of working Capital 
Management on SME profitability.” International Journal of Managerial Finance 
3, 164-177. 
 
Gill, A., N. Biger, and N. Mathur. 2010. “The Relationship Between Working Capital 
Management and Profitability: Evidence From The United States.” Business and 
Economics Journal 10, 1-19 
 
Gorton, G., and F.A. Schmid. 2000. “Universal Banking and the Performance of 
German Firms.” Journal of Financial Economics 58, 29-80. 
 
Green, W.H. 2011. “Econometric Analysis.” Prentice Hall. New York. 
 
Guiso, L., and R. Minetti. 2006. “Multiple Creditors and Information Rights: Theory 
and Evidence from U.S. Firms.” Center for Economic Policy Research Working 
Paper. London. 
 
Harhoff, D., and T. Körting. 1998a. “How Many creditors Does it Take to Tango?.” 
Working Paper. Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin. 
 
Harhoff, D., and T. Körting. 1998b. “Lending Relationships in Germany: Empirical 
Results from Survey Data.” Journal of Banking and Finance 22, 1317-1353. 
 
Harris, M., and A. Raviv. 1991. “The Theory of Capital Structure.” Journal of Finance 
46, 297-355. 
 
Hart, O.D. 1995. Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure. Oxford University Press. 
Oxford. 
 
Hiraki, T., A. Ito, and F. Kuroki. 2003. “Single versus Multiple Main Bank 
Relationships: Evidence from Japan.” Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=437320 
 
Hirshleifer, D., and A.V., Thakor. 1992. “Managerial Conservatism, Project Choice, and 
Debt.” The Review of Financial Studies 5 (3), 437-470. 
 
Horiuchi, T., 1994. “The Effect of Firm Status on Banking Relationships and Loan 
Syndication.” The Japanese Main Bank System. Oxford University Press. Oxford. 
258-294. 
 
Houston, J., and C.M. James. 1996. “Bank Information Monopolies and the Mix of 
Private and Public Debt Choices.” Journal of Finance 51, 1863–1889. 
 
126 
 
Hubert, F., and D. Schafer. 2002. “Coordination Failure with Multiple-Source Lending, 
the Cost of Protection against a Powerful Lender.” Journal of Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics 158, 256-275. 
 
Kang, J.K., and R.M. Stulz. 2000. “Do Banking Shocks Affect Borrowing Firm 
Performance? An Analysis of the Japanese Experience.” Journal of Business 73, 
1-24. 
 
Kornai, J. 1979. “Resource-Constrained versus Demand-Constrained Systems.” 
Econometrica 47 (4), 801-819. 
 
 ---. 1980. Economics of Shortage. Institute for International Economic Studies. 
University of Stockholm. 
 
 ---. 1986. “The soft Budget Constraint.” Kyklos 39, 3-30. 
 
Johnson, S., R. La Porta, F. López-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer. 2000. “Tunneling.” 
American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 90, 22–27. 
 
La Porta, R., F. López-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny. 1998. “Law and finance” 
Journal of Political Economy 106, 1113–1155. 
 
Leland, H.E., and D.H. Pyle. 1977. “Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure 
and Financial Intermediation.” Journal of Finance 32, 371-387. 
 
Levine, R. (1999), “Law, Finance and Economic Growth”, Journal of Financial 
Intermediation, 8: 8-35. 
 
Limpaphayom, P., and S. Polwitoon. 2004. “Bank Relationship and Firm Performance: 
Evidence From Thailand Before the Asian Financial Crisis.” Journal of Business 
Finance & Accounting. 31, 1577-1600. 
 
Maurer, N., and S. Haber. 2007. “Related Lending and Economic Performance.” The 
Journal of Economic History 67(3), 551-581 
 
Mishkin, F.S. 2008. “Leveraged Losses: Lessons from the Mortgage Meltdown.” 
Speech Presented at the U.S. Monetary Policy Forum, New York. Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Available at: 
http://www.c.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/mishkin20080229a.htm 
 
Montoriol-Garriga, J. 2006. “The Effect of Relationship Lending on Firm Performance.” 
Documents de Treball. Universitat Autònoma de Bercelona. Department 
D’Economia del’Empresa (5). 
 
127 
 
Neuberger, D., M. Pedergnana, and S. Räthke-Döppner. 2008. “Concentration of 
Banking Relationships in Switzerland: The Result of Firm Structure or Banking 
Market Structure.” Journal of Financial Services Research 33, 101-126. 
 
Ongena, S., and D.C. Smith. 2000a. “Bank Relationships: A Review.” Performance of 
Financial Institutions: Efficiency, Innovation, Regulation. Cambridge University 
Press. London. 221-258.  
 
Ongena, S., and D.C. Smith. 2000b. “What Determines the Number of Bank 
Relationships? Cross-Country Evidence.” Journal of Financial Intermediation 9, 
26–56.  
 
Ongena, S., and İ. Şendeniz-Yüncü. 2011. “Which Firms Engage Small, Foreign or 
Stake Banks? And who goes Islamic? Evidence from Turkey.” Journal of Banking 
and Finance 35 (12), 3213-3224. 
 
Ongena, S., G. Tümer-Alkan, and N. von Westernhagen. 2007. “Creditor Concentration: 
An Empirical Investigation.” Discussion Paper Series 2: Banking and Financial 
Studies. Deutsche Bundesbank. 
 
Petersen, M., and R. Rajan. 1994. “The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence 
From Small Business Data.” Journal of Finance 49, 1367–1400. 
 
Petersen, M., and R. Rajan. 1995. “The Effect of Credit Market Competition on Lending 
Relationships.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, 406–443. 
 
Qian, J., and P.E. Strahan. 2007. “How Law and Institutions Shape Financial Contracts: 
The Case of Bank Loans.” Journal of Finance 62, 2803-2834. 
 
Raheman, A., and M. Nasr. 2007. “Working Capital Management and Profitability – 
Case of Pakistani firms.” International Review of Business Research Papers 3, 
279-300. 
 
Rajan, R.G. 1992. “Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm’s 
Length Debt.” Journal of Finance 47 (4), 1367-1400. 
 
Ramakrishnan, R.T.S., and A.V. Thakor. 1984. “Information Reliability and a Theory of 
Financial Intermediation.” Review of Economic Studies 51 (3), 415-432. 
 
Refait, C. 2003. “La Multibancarité des Entreprises: Choix du Nombre de Banques vs. 
Choix du Nombre de Banque Principales.”  Revenue Economique 54, 649-661. 
 
Roberts, G.S., and N.A. Siddiqi. 2004. “Collateralization and the Number of Lenders in 
Private Debt Contracts: An Empirical Analysis.” Research in Finance 21, 229-252. 
 
128 
 
Sharpe, S., 1990. “Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending and Implicit Contracts: A 
Stylized Model of Customer Relationships.” Journal of Finance 45, 1069–1087. 
 
Skinner, D.J. 1993. “The Investment Opportunity Set and Accounting Procedure 
Choice: Preliminary Evidence.” Journal of Accounting and Economics 16 (4), 
407-445. 
 
Smith, K. 1980. “Profitability versus Liquidity Tradeoffs in Working Capital 
Management.” Readings on the Management of Working Capital. 549-562. 
 
Stancill, J.M. 1980. “Getting the Most from Your Banking Relationship.” Harvard 
Business Review 80, 141-145. 
 
Sterken, E., and I. Tokutsu. 2002. “What are the Determinants of the Number of Bank 
Relations of Japanese Firms?” Working Paper. Available at: http://www.eea-
esem.com/papers/eea-esem/esem2002/966/bfr.pdf 
 
Stulz, R. 1990. “ Managerial Discretion and Optimal Financing Policies.” Journal of 
Financial Economics 26, 3-27. 
 
Tirri, V. 2007. “Multiple banking Relationships and Credit Market Competition: What 
Benefits the Firm?” EFA Ljubljana Meeting Paper. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=966411 
 
Tsuruta, D. 2008. “Bank Information Monopoly and Trade Credit: Do only Banks Have 
Information About Small Businesses?” Applied Economics 40 (8), 981-996. 
 
Van Overfelt, W.A.J., M. De Ceuster, and M. Deloof. 2009. “Do Universal Banks 
Create Value? Universal Bank Affiliation and Company Performance in Belgium. 
1905-1909.” Explorations in Economic History 46 (2), 253-265. 
 
von Thadden, E.L. 1995. “Long-term Contracts, Short-term Investment, and 
Monitoring.” Review of Economic Studies 62, 557-575. 
 
von Thadden, E.L. 2004. “Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending and Implicit 
Contracts: The Winner’s Curse.” Finance Research Letters 1, 11-23. 
 
von Rheinbaben, J., and M. Ruckes. 2004. “The Number and the Closeness of Bank 
Relationships.”  Journal of Banking and Finance 28, 1597-1615. 
Weinstein, D. E., and Y. Yafeh. 1998. "On the Costs of a Bank-Centered Financial 
System: Evidence from the Changing Main Bank Relations in Japan." Journal of 
Finance 53, 635-672. 
 
Yosha, O., 1995. “Information Disclosure Costs and the Choice of financing Source.” 
Journal of Financial Intermediation 4, 3-20. 
129 
 
 
Yu, H.-C., and D.-T. Hsieh. 2003. “Multiple versus Single Banking Relationships in an 
Emerging Market: Some Taiwanese Evidence.” International Banking Issues. 
Nova Publishers. USA. 
 
Yu, H.-C., A.K. Pennathur, and D.-T. Hsieh. 2007. “How Does Public Debt 
Compliment the Interrelationships between Banking Relationships and Firm 
Profitability?” International Research Journal of Finance and Economics 12, 36-
55. 
 
Ziane, Y. 2003. “Number of Banks and Credit Relationships: Empirical Results from 
French Small Business Data.” European Review of Economics and Finance 2, 30-
46. 
130 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
Table A: Gross Domestic Product Results 
 
Years Quarter 
GDP Current 
Prices 
(million TL) 
Growth 
Rate (%) 
GDP Constant 
Prices 
(million TL) 
Growth 
Rate (%) 
2007 
I 187,951 17.4 22,844 8.1 
II 203,280 10.7 24,581 3.8 
III 232,257 8.9 27,772 3.2 
IV 219,691 9.1 26,057 4.2 
Annual 843,178 11.2 101,255 4.7 
2008 
I 215,606 14.7 24,446 7.0 
II 239,363 17.8 25,226 2.6 
III 262,392 13.0 28,010 0.9 
IV 233,173 6.1 24,240 -7.0 
Annual 950,534 12.7 101,922 0.7 
2009 
I 207,926 -3.6 20,843 -14.7 
II 228,572 -4.5 23,267 -7.8 
III 261,710 -0.3 27,233 -2.8 
IV 254,350 9.1 25,660 5.9 
Annual 952,559 0.2 97,003 -4.8 
2010 
I 241,026 15.9 23,467 12.6 
II 265,997 16.4 25,692 10.4 
III 295,996 13.1 28,670 5.3 
IV 295,781 16.3 28,056 9.3 
Annual 1,098,799 15.4 105,886 9.2 
2011 
I 287,991 19.5 26,251 11.9 
II 315,493 18.6 28,021 9.1 
III 351,654 18.8 31,087 8.4 
IV 339,755 14.9 29,515 5.2 
Annual 1,294,893 17.8 114,874 8.5 
Source: www.treasury.gov.tr 
 
  
131 
 
APPENDIX B 
 
Table B: Results of the Hausman Test  
(Dependent Variable is Firm Permance, measured with ROA) 
            
  ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA 
Intercept -0.0484 -0.0404 -0.0939 -0.0439 0.1454 
  (.0674) (.1292) 0.0007 (.0927) (.0001) 
NUMBERB -0.0109 - - - - 
  (<.0001)         
NUMBERS - (.0129) - - - 
    (.0458)       
NUMBERF - - -0.0448 - - 
      (<.0001)     
NUMBERP - - - -(.0325) - 
        (<.0001)   
NUMBERI - - - - -(.1923) 
          (<.0001) 
Residual Values 0.0109 -0.0129 0.0448 0.0325 0.1923 
  (<.0001) (.0631) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
LOGAGE 0.0256 0.0187 0.0281 0.0524 -0.0216 
  (.0557) (.1656) 0.036 (.0002) (.1281) 
SIZE 0.0735 0.0485 0.0773 0.0801 0.0577 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
GROWTHOPP -0.2152 -0.1859 -0.1883 -0.2451 -0.1739 
  (.0092) (.0254) 0.0222 (.0028) (.034) 
LEVERAGE -0.0540 -0.1010 -0.0536 -0.0444 -0.0531 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
BMEMBER -0.0083 0.0029 -0.0200 -0.0135 -0.0185 
  (.2319) (.6581) 0.0091 (.0487) (.011) 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-Stat. 25.68* 23.98* 25.93* 27.79* 26.70* 
Adj R-Sq 0.246 0.233 0.248 0.262 0.254 
# of observation 1663 1663 1663 1663 1663 
* Significant at 1% level. 
P-values are reported in parenthesis. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Table C: Relationship between the Number of Banking Relationships  
and Firm Innovativeness 
  INNOVA2 GSEC2 GSEC3 GSEC4 GSEC5 GSEC6 GSEC8 
NUMBERB -18.1226 -3137.83 2.409291 309.534 51.70329 2.335725 -129.454 
F-Stat.: 16.77* 
Adj R-Sq: 0.18551 
0.3757 0.0413 0.8766 0.9855 0.625 0.788 0.897 
NUMBERS -1.39256 -940.306 3.800739 -36.8473 -46.0706 0.112166 -21.2371 
F-Stat.: 20.73* 
Adj R-Sq: 0.22178 
0.7767 0.0109 0.3077 0.9928 0.0697 0.9571 0.9295 
NUMBERF -6.81806 -811.699 -3.50138 -2257.07 57.91894 0.243328 -153.589 
F-Stat.: 12.72* 
Adj R-Sq: 0.14447 
0.3879 0.1714 0.5589 0.7322 0.1562 0.9421 0.6906 
NUMBERP 0.267355 -1174.56 0.334689 -879.311 34.86581 1.479578 499.8699 
F-Stat.: 14.57* 
Adj R-Sq: 0.16381 
0.368 0.1756 0.9695 0.9273 0.559 0.7627 0.3754 
NUMBERI 1.819459 -136.491 2.239619 -350.291 -3.83257 -1.13507 -354.921 
F-Stat.: 10.03* 
Adj R-Sq: 0.11539 
0.4427 0.4434 0.213 0.8595 0.7545 0.2594 0.0022 
* Significant at 1% level. 
The variables GSECi are the interaction variables between INNOVA and each SECi, where i=1,…,8. Since firms 
operating in SEC1 and SEC7 have no R&D expenditure, the values of the variable INNOVA are zero for these 
firms. Therefore, model does not provide any estimation for the interaction variables GSEC1 and GSEC7. 
P-values are reported in parenthesis. 
 
